Michigan Technological University

Digital Commons @ Michigan Tech
Dissertations, Master's Theses and Master's Reports
2015

THE 2009 AND 2011 HAZARD EVENTS AT SAN VICENTE
VOLCANO, EL SALVADOR: VULNERABILITY, RESETTLEMENT, AND
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
Luke Bowman
Michigan Technological University, ljbowman@mtu.edu

Copyright 2015 Luke Bowman
Recommended Citation
Bowman, Luke, "THE 2009 AND 2011 HAZARD EVENTS AT SAN VICENTE VOLCANO, EL SALVADOR:
VULNERABILITY, RESETTLEMENT, AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION", Open Access Dissertation,
Michigan Technological University, 2015.
https://doi.org/10.37099/mtu.dc.etdr/8

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mtu.edu/etdr
Part of the Geology Commons

THE 2009 AND 2011 HAZARD EVENTS AT SAN VICENTE VOLCANO, EL
SALVADOR: VULNERABILITY, RESETTLEMENT, AND DISASTER RISK
REDUCTION

By
Luke J. Bowman

A DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In Geology
MICHIGAN TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
2015

© 2015 Luke J. Bowman

This dissertation has been approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Geology.

Department of Geological/Mining Engineering and Sciences

Dissertation Co-Advisor:

Dr. John. S. Gierke

Dissertation Co-Advisor:

Dr. William I. Rose

Committee Member:

Dr. Kari B. Henquinet

Committee Member:

Dr. Samuel Sweitz

Department Chair:

Dr. John S. Gierke

Dedication:
To my family, my friends, and my colleagues in El Salvador.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ......................................................................................................................... VI
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. VII
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ 1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 3
1.1 DISASTERS AND DEVELOPMENT ......................................................................... 4
1.2

DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ............................... 8

1.3

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS ........................................ 10

1.3.1 MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS) ..................................................... 11
1.3.2 HYOGO FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (HFA) ............................................................ 12
1.3.3 INTEGRATED RESEARCH ON DISASTER RISK (IRDR) ............................................ 12
1.4 DISSERTATION PROBLEM STATEMENT AND OBJECTIVES AND
MOTIVATION ................................................................................................................. 14
1.5 DISSERTATION OUTLINE...................................................................................... 17
1.5.1 CHAPTER 2: UNIVERSITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO RISK REDUCTION FOLLOWING A
DISASTER: A CASE STUDY OF REORIENTING NATURAL HAZARDS RESEARCH
EFFORTS AT SAN VICENTE VOLCANO, EL SALVADOR ....................................... 17
1.5.2 CHAPTER 3: DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS AT SAN
VICENTE (CHICHONTEPEC) VOLCANO, EL SALVADOR: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL AND GEOPHYSICAL VULNERABILITY ...................................................... 18
1.5.3 CHAPTER 4: INTERPRETING SATURATION CHANGES AS A POTENTIAL FACTOR IN
SHALLOW, RAINFALL-INDUCED LANDSLIDES FROM TIME-LAPSE SEISMIC
REFRACTION, SAN VICENTE VOLCANO, EL SALVADOR ..................................... 19
1.6 CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................... 19
1.7 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 21
CHAPTER 2: UNIVERSITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO RISK REDUCTION
FOLLOWING A DISASTER: A CASE STUDY OF REORIENTING NATURAL
HAZARDS RESEARCH EFFORTS AT SAN VICENTE VOLCANO, EL SALVADOR
........................................................................................................................................... 25
2.1.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 26

2.2

BACKGROUND AND METHODS ................................................................ 28

2.3.

RESULTS ......................................................................................................... 34

2.3.1 TROPICAL DEPRESSION 12E............................................................................... 35

2.3.1.1 Local Observers ............................................................................................................38
2.3.1.2 Weather Station Network ............................................................................................39
POST 12E EFFORTS ............................................................................................ 39

2.3.2
2.4
DISCUSSION ................................................................................................... 44
2.5

CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................. 46
iv

2.6 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 47
CHAPTER 3: DISASTER RISK REDUCTION AND RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS AT
SAN VICENTE (CHICHONTEPEC) VOLCANO, EL SALVADOR: TOWARD
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL AND GEOPHYSICAL VULNERABILITY ................. 51
ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................... 51
3.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 52
3.2 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................ 54
3.2.1 RELOCATION OF AT-RISK COMMUNITIES AND DISASTERS .................................... 54
3.2.2 GEOPHYSICAL VULNERABILITY IN EL SALVADOR ................................................ 57
3.2.3 SOCIAL VULNERABILITY IN SAN VICENTE ............................................................ 57

3.2.3.1 Community and Livelihoods in Verapaz ............................................................................59

3.3 METHODS ................................................................................................................. 63
3.4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ................................................................................ 66
3.4.1 DISASTER KNOWLEDGE OF AUTHORITIES AND AT-RISK POPULATIONS: BEFORE AND
AFTER 2009 ........................................................................................................ 67
3.4.2 THE 2009 EVENT AND OFFICIAL RESPONSE .......................................................... 70
3.4.3 COMMUNITY-BASED EARLY WARNING SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS............................ 74
3.4.4 MIXED SUCCESS IN RELOCATION EFFORTS ........................................................... 77
3.4.5 DISRUPTION OF LIVELIHOODS DUE TO RELOCATION ............................................. 79
3.4.6 DISRUPTION OF SOCIAL AND KINSHIP NETWORKS AND TIES TO HOME ................. 81
3.4.7 RELOCATION SUCCESS .......................................................................................... 83
3.5 CONCLUSIONS......................................................................................................... 84
3.6 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................... 87
CHAPTER 4: FIELD CHARACTERIZATION OF WEATHERED VOLCANIC
SLOPES FOR RAINFALL-INDUCED LANDSLIDE POTENTIAL: SAN VICENTE
VOLCANO, EL SALVADOR ......................................................................................... 92
4.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 93
4.2 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................ 95
4.3 METHODS ................................................................................................................. 97
4.3.1 SITE IDENTIFICATION AND SURVEY TIMING .......................................................... 97
4.3.2 TIME-LAPSE SEISMIC REFRACTION ....................................................................... 98
4.4 RESULTS ................................................................................................................. 100
4.4.1 LOS INFIERNILLOS ............................................................................................... 100
4.4.2 FINCA EL CARMEN.............................................................................................. 102
4.4.3 FINCA 3 RIOS ...................................................................................................... 107
4.5 DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................... 113
4.6 CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................... 116
4.7 REFERENCES ......................................................................................................... 117
v

Preface

Chapter 2. University contributions to risk reduction in a post-disaster context: A case
study of reorienting research efforts at San Vicente volcano, El Salvador
This chapter has been submitted to a special paper of the Geological Society of
America, titled, “Geoscience for the Public Good and Global Development.” This
manuscript incorporates edits from three external reviewers. L. Bowman conducted
interviews and participant observation, coded qualitative data (interviews, field notes, and
documents), translated Spanish quotations into English, and drafted the manuscript. J.S.
Gierke helped develop the thesis of the manuscript, organize and edit the written text, and
situate our work within the evolution of DRR in San Vicente. J.F. Cruz provided
information regarding the role of UES-FMP in San Vicente, as well as, an account of
DRR progress in the region since L. Bowman’s departure in 2012.
Chapter 3. Disaster risk reduction and resettlement efforts at San Vicente
(Chichontepec) Volcano, El Salvador: toward understanding social and
geophysical vulnerability
This paper was published in the Journal of Applied Volcanology and is written by
L. Bowman and K. Henquinet. L. Bowman conducted all interviews and participant
observation, coded qualitative data (interviews, field notes, and documents), translated
Spanish quotations into English, and drafted the manuscript. K. Henquinet helped with
the research design and development of the interview guide, as well as manuscript
organization, thesis development, and writing. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Chapter 4. Interpreting saturation changes as a potential factor in shallow, rainfallinduced landslides from time-lapse seismic refraction, San Vicente Volcano,
El Salvador
This manuscript is in preparation to be submitted. L. Bowman organized logistics for
the field work in El Salvador, conducted field work, aided in data processing and
interpretation, and wrote portions of the manuscript. J.P. Richardson conducted field
work, processed and interpreted data, generated figures, and developed portions of the
manuscript. J.S. Gierke proposed the research, conducted field work, interpreted data,
and developed and revised the text.
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Abstract
Scientists from a variety of disciplines have made major advancements in the
geophysical and social aspects of hazard science. Despite these advancements, economic
losses and the number of people affected by disasters continue to rise. The field of
disaster risk reduction (DRR) attempts to counter this rising trend of disaster losses by
integrating a variety of disciplines to holistically solve complex problems related to risk
and vulnerability. Frequent disasters in El Salvador provide insight into the evolution of
DRR and its application during and after two hydrometeorological disasters in the
department of San Vicente in 2009 and 2011. This dissertation is divided into four
chapters beginning with a unifying introduction that describes contextual background
details about DRR policy and why El Salvador was chosen as a field site. Chapter 2 uses
qualitative research methods like participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and
document review to analyze the evolution of DRR in San Vicente and highlights the
unique role of the Universidad de El Salvador – Facultad Multidiscplinaria Paracentral in
directing new research and training programs toward reducing disaster risk. Chapter 3
uses similar ethnographic methods within the heavily damaged community of Verapaz to
analyze local residents’ perceptions of a relocation scheme designed to reduce physical
vulnerability to debris flows. This publication demonstrates that aspects of social
vulnerability were not adequately considered, as the majority of homes deemed
“uninhabitable” continue to be occupied by residents, but residents who received a new
home have developed unanticipated strategies to diversify livelihoods and reduce risk to
disasters. Chapter 4 describes a concerted effort to improve our understanding of slope
stability and shallow landslides using time-lapse seismic refraction methods. Data
acquired during two field campaigns demonstrated survey repeatability and a validation
of methods used, however saturated layers and perched water tables, which were
hypothesized to be a contributing factor to rainfall-induced landslide generation, were not
able to be imaged. The four chapters of this dissertation touch on important aspects
relevant to local communities and institutions living and working in San Vicente where
landslides, debris flows, and flooding have affected the region. The interdisciplinary
1

nature of this research incorporates the voices, personal experience, and expertise of
academics, community members, institutional representatives, politicians, and DRR
practitioners in an attempt to holistically address the pressing concern of recurrent natural
hazards for the region around San Vicente volcano.

2

Chapter 1: Introduction
Scientists from a variety of disciplines have made major advancements in the
geophysical and social aspects of hazard science. Determining hazard magnitudes,
distribution, probabilities, recurrence intervals, and even forecasting have all improved
over the last several decades. Similarly, an improved understanding of the dimensions of
risk and vulnerability have triggered new strategies to reduce disaster risk by
transitioning focus from the geophysical factors that trigger a hazard event to the socialstructural causes that perpetuate and institutionalize human vulnerability.
Despite these technological and scientific advancements, economic losses and the
number of people affected by disasters continue to rise (Keen et al. 2003). Global
population growth and increased development are contributing factors in these trends;
however, the changing demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of highly
urbanized communities located in hazardous regions, along with increased extreme
weather events, are mostly responsible for the documented increase in disaster losses
(Donner and Rodriguez 2011; Public Safety Canada). The frequency of recorded disasters
have risen from about “100 per decade during the period 1900 – 1940; 650 per decade in
the 1960s; 2000 per decade in the 1980s; and reaching almost 4800 per decade in the
1990s to more than 7200 in the 2000s (IRDR 2013). Part of this increase in frequency
and magnitude of disasters can be attributed to human-induced climate change—
particularly weather-related events like storms and floods (IPCC 2007; Bouwer et al.
2007). Though the number of people killed by disasters has begun to decrease due to
better forecasting and warning, there are rising numbers destroyed livelihoods and
adverse economic impacts. “Since 1997, there has been a several-fold increase in
weather-related economic losses” (ICSU 2008: 9).
In 2010, El Salvador was ranked as the country the most vulnerable to natural
hazards in the world (UNDAC 2010). Their colonial history, geography, socioeconomic
marginalization of the poor, and a statewide shift toward neoliberal development policies
has created a state that shifts development and disaster risk reduction responsibilities to
non-governmental organizations, while at the same time reaping the benefits from
3

continued foreign disaster aid for reconstruction after disasters that is not adequately
invested in disaster reduction or preparedness (Anderson and Woodrow 1989 from
Tellman 2011; Schipper and Pelling 2006; Wisner 2001).
This dissertation draws from recent disasters in El Salvador to show that
insufficiently addressing the underlying, root causes of vulnerability perpetuates high risk
levels for Salvadorans, which exacerbates disaster losses. Despite many scientific,
technological, and development efforts, rural Salvadorans continue to be threatened by
natural hazards.
The research is framed around two disasters at San Vicente Volcano in 2009 and
2011and provides insight into how disaster risk reduction and research has evolved in the
region. The design and implementation of a relocation scheme highlights dimensions of
the underlying causes of social and physical vulnerability as they relate to volcanic and
hydrometeorological hazards. A multi-institutional effort to better understand the
geophysical triggers of shallow landslides and debris-flows (lahars) was undertaken to
improve slope stability monitoring and hazard preparedness for the region.

1.1 Disasters and development
Natural disasters are often viewed as unpredictable events that humans cannot
control. Most efforts related towards disaster research are directed at studying the
physical hazards that cause disasters or the capacity for engineered mitigation projects to
reduce disaster risk. These efforts receive the most focus after a disaster occurs when the
impacts are highlighted by media and of particular interest for donor and research
institutions. It has long been thought that a more complete understanding in the field of
hazard science would eventually reduce risk to hazards and decrease the number of
disasters (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Smith 2013). There is a global promotion of
sustainable development aimed at empowering communities and reducing poverty, which
would seem a natural step to reduce societies’ exposure to hazards; however, global
disaster risk continues to increase (Thomalla et al. 2006).
Figure 1 shows the increase in the number of recorded disasters from 1900 –
2011. Figure 2 shows the rising costs of disaster impacts from 1975 – 2011. Part of this
4

rise is artificial due to better reporting by agencies like USAID and the Red Cross;
however, roughly two-thirds of the rise is real due to increased hydro-meteorological
events affecting increasingly vulnerable populations (Than 2005). Though the number of
fatalities has decreased during the last decade, the number of individuals adversely
affected continues to rise.

Figure 1.1 Number of recorded disasters from 1900 – 2011 (Modified from EM-DAT
2011).

5

Figure 1.2 Estimated damages (US $billion) cause by reported disasters 1975-2011
(Modified from EM-DAT 2011).
Evidence shows that disasters are becoming more frequent due to climate change
and a higher concentration of the world’s growing population residing in hazardous areas
(Keen et al. 2003; IPCC 2012). Hydro-meteorological hazards related to climate change
affect an increasing number of people and economies (Thomalla et al. 2006). In 1980,
roughly 100 hydrometeorological disasters were reported, but by 2000 that number
increased to 300/year and continued to rise (Guha-Sapir from Than 2005). From 2000 to
2011, the impacts of disasters globally totaled US$1.7 trillion in damage, 2.9 billion
individuals affected, and 1.2 million people killed (UNISDR 2013). Not only is the
frequency of disasters increasing, but human “vulnerability is also increasing due to
rising poverty, a growing global population, armed conflict and other underlying development issues” (Schipper and Pelling 2006). The relationship between development
activities, increasing vulnerability, and the rise in number and magnitude of disasters
supports the need for research into disaster risk reduction and management.
Anthropological work directed toward hazard and risk has created wider
recognition of the root causes that create human vulnerability and that disasters are, in
6

fact, part of “the normal order of the things, that is, the conditions of inequality and
subordination in the society rather than the accidental geophysical features of a place”
(Oliver-Smith 2009). Especially over the last 30 years, researchers and practitioners have
explored and promoted the notion that disasters are not “random acts of God” but rather a
confluence of nature and social structures (Hewitt 1983; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman
1999; Lewis 1999). Societies, communities, and nations are structured and develop in
ways that expose humankind to natural occurring phenomena that systemically foster the
conditions that exacerbate the impacts of hazard events. Additionally, the poorest and
most disadvantaged populations suffer the greatest consequences when hazard events
occur. “Today it is acknowledged that those affected by disasters tend to be people who
are marginalized in three ways; geographically, because they live in marginal, hazardprone areas; socially, because they are poor; and politically, because their voice is
disregarded” (Gaillard et al. 2007; Mercer 2008).
A paradigm shift away from traditional “disaster response” towards state
investment in disaster risk reduction (DRR) has slowly worked itself into governmental
policy. Traditionally, disasters were “managed” through reactionary responses to the
aftermath (i.e., search and rescue; provision of shelter, food, medical care, reconstruction,
etc.) and responding to affected populations’ needs. These response efforts are vital but
insufficient without consideration of reducing vulnerability and risks for the next events.
The Haitian earthquake in 2010 (which killed ~160,000 people) highlights the disparity
between effective DRR and disaster response: “After 11 days of intense effort of 43
rescue teams supported by roughly 2000 US soldiers…133 persons were rescued alive
from the rubble,” which stirs Oliver-Smith (2013: 2) to ask how many more thousands
could have been saved, “if adequate resources and efforts were invested in development
policies and practices that factored in exposure, risk and social vulnerability?”
El Salvador is another prime example of a country where the focus is on response
rather than risk reduction. Approximately US$4 million is invested each year in El
Salvador for disaster prevention. Yet the nation received about US$150 million in 2011
after Tropical Depression 12E (Tellman 2011) and almost none of the aid went to risk
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reduction even though rain-induced hazards (flooding and landslides) are almost annual
occurrences.
Examples like Haiti and El Salvador show how a reliance on disaster management
and reconstruction is insufficient since it does not effectively address socially constructed
vulnerability (e.g., Oliver-Smith 2013; Wisner 2001; Barton 2015; Tellman 2011;
Bowman and Henquinet 2015). Similar results from other cases have helped shift
responsibility from disaster management approaches and disaster responders to the
planners, scientists, development experts, and governments that invest in preparedness,
education, monitoring, and pre-disaster planning—all tenets of DRR. The continuing rise
in economic costs and lives impacted shows that this transition takes time, investment,
and political will to counter current trends.

1.2 Disaster Risk Reduction and Development
Disasters hinder development by disrupting livelihoods. Many response-focused
agencies have evolved to broadening their energies towards preparedness and education
initiatives to transmit hazard information. Paton (2000: 1) asserts, “while public
education programs may be successful in promoting awareness, additional interpretive
processes influence whether a threat is accepted and whether the person acts to reduce
this risk.” In many cases where outreach efforts have been applied, education and
increasing hazard awareness alone does not decrease the number or severity of disasters.
Integrating a participatory approach that incorporates at-risk populations within the
research process and veering away from passive learning strategies is an underexplored
method to create a more lasting impact on at-risk populations and their behavior during
emergencies.
The need for a new approach to natural disaster reduction was highlighted by the
United Nations’ Declaration of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction
(IDNDR). This strategy was developed in the late 1980s to foster “international
cooperation in the field of natural disasters reduction” to be implemented throughout the
1990s (Lechat 1990: 2). At the onset of the IDNDR, Lechat (1990) idealized that “recent
breakthroughs in knowledge and advances in technology now make it possible to
8

envisage a large mobilization of resources in order to reduce the tragedy of natural
disasters.”
The IDNDR was an important first step in outlining specific goals for: 1)
improving the capacity of countries to mitigate the effects of natural disasters, 2) devising
appropriate strategies to apply existing scientific and technical knowledge, 3) fostering
scientific and engineering endeavors, 4) disseminating knowledge, and 5) monitoring and
evaluation of disaster reduction efforts (Lechat 1990). Unfortunately, a reduction in
disasters did not occur (United Nations 1999). At the end of the IDNDR, the United
Nations lamented: “despite a decade of dedicated efforts, the number and costs of natural
disasters continue to rise, given the increasing vulnerability of our societies to natural
hazards” (United Nations 1999). The 10-year-long strategy steered new investment and
research toward DRR but did not achieve its desired goals. At the effort’s conclusion, it
was stated that “more than ever there is a need to strengthen and broaden disaster
prevention programs and, above all, to obtain political commitment…for a proactive
management of risk and application of science and technology at all levels to mitigate the
impact of natural disasters” (United Nations 1999). The UN’s dedication to continued
investment in DRR was made apparent through later efforts detailed below.
Reducing disaster risk is vital for sustainable development, especially in
developing nations (Schipper and Pelling 2006). The socioeconomic dimensions of
disaster risk reduction are intricately linked to development, as pointed out by OliverSmith (2013: 2): “Risk and vulnerability are in large measure the products of historical
and existing processes of social and economic development.” For example, the
development realities in Indonesia show the interrelated nature of development and
disasters. As population grows, subsistence farming methods and land-use changes cause
deforestation and the need for more roads (Coca 2015). These changes represent steps
taken to facilitate economic development in impoverished, rural areas. However, these
steps toward development have consequences related to slope stability. Landslides, which
are increasingly prevalent due to human-induced landscape and climate change, now
account for more combined deaths in Indonesia than tsunami, volcanic eruptions, and
earthquakes (Coca 2015).
9

Effective disaster preparedness and risk reduction should provide citizens with
tools, knowledge, and institutional support to survive hazard events with little disruption
to livelihood activities and social networks. Successful disaster risk reduction schemes
plan for both the potential physical impacts of a hazard event and the socio-economic and
cultural implications for the affected population. Disaster risk reduction also achieves
broader success when designed and implemented with input from the affected population
alongside expert planners and authorities. Many cases have successfully incorporated
local/indigenous knowledge in designing culturally appropriate risk reduction efforts
(Cronin et al. 2004; Mercer et al. 2007; Mercer et al. 2008; Mercer et al. 2009; Németh
and Cronin 2009). Finally, DRR should focus not only on reducing physical exposure to
hazards but also strive to address the “root causes” of social vulnerability that perpetuate
risk to natural hazards (Wisner 2001).
While disaster risk reduction is inherently linked to sustainable development,
DRR is not necessarily a product of development. The current situation of high
vulnerability and risk can be attributed to development initiatives that place unfair strains
on the poorest populations. Oliver-Smith (2013: 2) asserts that, “Many of the processes
that drive risk and vulnerability are standard development strategies.” There are many
challenges ahead and a long history of “the way things have always been done” to get
beyond. Mercer et al. (2008) explain that while
“disaster risk reduction research has steadily developed, strategies implemented to
reduce risk often continue to operate in a top-down fashion, ignoring social
dynamics, [and] vulnerability is not reduced because ‘at-risk people are not made
visible, are not reached or are not included in decision-making processes.”
Recognizing the aforementioned challenges to integrate DRR and development
spurred the United Nations to incorporate DRR into the design of development goals
outlined and adopted in 2000 (United Nations 2000; Pelling et al. 2004). Since 2000,
DRR strategies have been revisited and revised with new directives by evolving DRR
think tanks.

1.3 United Nations Development Efforts
10

1.3.1 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
The realization that disasters hinder development and that integrating DRR into
development is extremely difficult spurred the United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) to detail further efforts and new methodologies to improve
the incorporation of DRR into development plans in order to meet the MDGs. After the
conclusion of the IDNDR, the United Nations issued its Millennium Declaration
establishing the following eight development goals in 2000:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)

Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Achieve universal primary education
Promote gender equality and empower women
Reduce child mortality
Improve maternal health
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Ensure environmental sustainability
Establish a global partnership for development (United Nations 2000)

These “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs) were to be achieved by 2015
and provided the framework used by most development institutions since the Declaration.
The strategic plan includes DRR components as it “seeks to reduce the number and
impacts of disasters” by achieving these goals (UN 2000; Schipper and Pelling 2006).
The Declaration not only states the importance of reducing hazards, but also outlines
specific DRR actions to achieve its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These
include:
1) Develop early warning systems
2) Develop vulnerability maps
3) Promote research into the causes of disasters
The eight MDGs promulgated in 2000 are widely viewed as achievable by
development institutions. Schipper and Pelling (2006) stressed that incorporating the
tenets of disaster risk reduction into the MDGs is key in order to fully meet the objectives
in a sustainable manner. The MDGs have achieved some criticism due to the conflictive
relationship between development and disaster risk reduction efforts. Critics of the
MDGs (Attaran 2005; Bendaña (2004, loc. cit. Schipper and Pelling (2006)) are
11

concerned that a narrow focus and interpretation of the MDGs limits the integration of
disaster risk reduction into broader development plans.

1.3.2 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)
The 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction (WCDR) in Kobe, Japan
resulted in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 (HFA): Building the Resilience
of Nations and Communities to Disasters—a 10-year plan to reduce disaster risk by
promoting more sustainable development in both nations and communities designed by
the UNISDR program. It is the first plan of its kind to “explain, describe, and detail the
work that is required from all different sectors and actors to reduce disaster losses”
(UNISDR 2015a). The plan specifies that disaster risk is a global concern that is
“compounded by increasing vulnerabilities related to changing demographic,
technological and socio-economic conditions, unplanned urbanization,
development within high-risk zones, under-development, environmental
degradation, climate variability, climate change, geological hazards, competition
for scarce resources, and the impact of epidemics” all of which “points to a future
where disasters could increasingly threaten the world’s economy, and its
population and the sustainable development of developing countries” (UNISDR
2005).
The advancements made during the decade-long program towards “knowledge,
practice, implementation, experience, and science for disaster risk reduction” inspired the
United Nations General Assembly to pass a subsequent resolution to further refine
appropriate strategies beyond the year 2015 (UNISDR 2015b). This post-2015
Framework was recently proposed during the 3rd World Conference on Disaster Risk
Reduction in Sendai, Japan in March 2015, which represents a growing acceptance that
DRR is a priority and that the strategies to achieve global goals are constantly evolving.

1.3.3 Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR)
In 2005, an assessment by the International Council for Science (ICSU) stressed
that one of the great challenges to development is “the widening gap between advancing
science and technology and society’s ability to capture and use them” (ICSU 2005).
Likewise, increasing disaster impacts in both developed and developing countries
12

suggests that reducing hazard risk through economic growth and current development
policy will not alone reduce disaster losses. These realizations spurred the ICSU,
UNISDR, and the International Social Science Council (ISSC) to design a decade-long
plan (2008-2017)—Integrated Research on Disaster Risk (IRDR)—aimed at:
1) Characterizing hazards, vulnerability, and risk
2) Understanding decision-making in complex and changing risk contexts
3) Reducing risk and curbing losses through knowledge-based actions (ICSU
2008)
After 10 years, IRDR aims to see a reduction in disaster losses when compared to
similar hazards events prior to 2008. IRDR is a key partner in the United Nations efforts
and helped construct the frameworks used throughout the international community. One
advancement has been a new IRDR strategy to integrate science into DRR policy. Teams
of researchers and “specialists from any and all relevant fields” now develop Forensic
Disaster Investigations (FDIs) to study specific disaster cases in order to “probe more
deeply into the complex and underlying causes of growing disaster losses” (Burton 2010:
36).
FDIs are not meant to blame entities or individuals for weaknesses that exacerbate
disaster impacts since responsibilities, but rather highlight ways in which previous
systems can be modified in order to prevent future disaster losses. Disaster impacts rarely
are the responsibility of a single person or institution, as social vulnerability and exposure
to hazards are conditions structured by societal and political systems. The goal of the
FDIs is to promote a cultural paradigm shift that allows institutions and governments to
explore a new discourse that recognizes and addresses the structural weaknesses that lead
to vulnerability, rather than solely focusing on disaster response and reconstruction.
The FDI framework defines four research methodologies that draw from
interdisciplinary fields to “provide a mechanism for developing better comparative
understandings of the root causes and underlying process that lead to disaster risk in
diverse socioeconomic, cultural, national, regional, and local settings” (Burton 2010: 40).
This effort represents the latest project design in a long evolution of DRR strategies that
shift focus from the geophysical triggers of the disaster and offer an assessment of the
structural causes of disasters.
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All of these aforementioned initiatives demonstrate a global shift in attitudes on
how best to design and implement disaster risk reduction. Rising disaster losses plainly
show that changing rhetoric does not alone reduce risk, however nor do the traditional
strategies of disaster management and reconstruction. Globally accepted frameworks
designed by experts from many fields, however, now address root causes of vulnerability.
Most importantly, acceptance and endorsement of these frameworks by donor countries
and institutions like the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund
could help pressure and guide countries that receive aid to invest more in disaster risk
reduction rather than disaster symptoms.

1.4 Dissertation Problem Statement and Objectives and
Motivation
The design of my doctoral research integrates two interconnected interests: (1) the
geological and hydrometeorological phenomena that trigger hazard events, and (2) the
desire to better prepare at-risk communities to reduce disaster impacts. After having spent
two years volunteering in the U.S. Peace Corps in Honduras, one year of which was
during the most active hurricane seasons on record (2005), I saw first-hand how natural
hazard processes intrude upon, and often overcome the capacities of, rural communities
that are ill-prepared for natural hazards (Trenberth and Shea 2006).
I enrolled in graduate studies at Michigan Technological University in 2007 to
receive academic and professional training that would allow me to blend my interests in
geological hazards with field research in Latin America. I conducted my M.S. research
within a Salvadoran community for five months, analyzing disaster prevention and
mitigation measures implemented by an NGO at Santa Ana volcano, El Salvador
(Bowman 2009). Three weeks after defending my M.S. thesis in October 2009, the
Hurricane Ida lahar disaster occurred on the northern slopes of San Vicente volcano in El
Salvador. Initial reports by media and colleagues on the ground described poorly
prepared communities, no warnings nor preventative evacuation measures, and lackluster
institutional support and coordination. News of this event solidified my goal to return to
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El Salvador to apply important lessons learned at Santa Ana volcano and expand into
new, exploratory research activities in this post-disaster setting.
In 2011, I proposed a research plan to the U.S. Fulbright Student Scholar
program, titled, “Developing Culturally Appropriate Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies
in El Salvador,” which provided support for a nine-month-long field season. At the same
time, the Agricultural Sciences department at the Universidad de El Salvador – Facultad
Multidisciplinaria Paracentral campus in San Vicente formally requested a U.S. Peace
Corps Response volunteer to assist the University with disaster prevention and mitigation
activities. Both projects’ objectives were well-aligned (see Chapter 2), and I was accepted
for both positions, resulting in a 15-month-long period working alongside communities
and institutions in DRR.
My work integrates two disciplines—geology and anthropology—to provide a
holistic understanding of how communities prepare for natural hazards. In order to
understand and reduce natural hazard impacts, it is necessary to integrate a geological
understanding of hazard triggers with a socio-cultural understanding of the population atrisk.
My research premise was articulated best in June 2010, when scientists from the
Volcano Disaster Assistance Program (a USGS/USAID Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance joint effort) provided technical advice to the Salvadoran hazard-monitoring
agency, Servicio Nacional de Estudios Territoriales (SNET), concerning the November
2009 disaster at San Vicente Volcano (Schweig 2010). Along with a better
characterization of slope stability, the team recommended more sustained and robust
outreach efforts with the at-risk population in order to reduce disaster risk.
“An active education and outreach program is critical for reducing the loss of life
and property from landslides and debris flows. Such a program should focus on
the population potentially at risk from these hazards. It should provide enough
information to give them an accurate perception of the hazardous process, an
awareness of the spatial extent of hazardous areas, an ability to recognize the
conditions that are likely to generate landslides and debris flows, and the practical
steps they can take to ensure their safety” (Schweig et al, 2010).
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The design of this research study was predicated on contributing to the
recommendations outlined by the USGS VDAP scientists. Some of the results of this
research address parts of this stated need. The outcomes demonstrate the importance of
incorporating all stakeholders in data gathering, processing, and dissemination. The
tenets of the research and project design help equip local institutions and community
leaders with the necessary information and tools to help in decision-making prior to and
during emergencies, while fostering collaborative research and engagement. The
participatory nature of the research explores an underused strategy to achieve risk
reduction goals in the at-risk areas on volcanoes in underdeveloped countries. The goals
of this study are as follows:
1. Improve the understanding of institutional efforts to help communities prepare
for hazard events and evaluate how these efforts are perceived/adopted by
area populations.
2. Improve the understanding of resettlement policy designs and
implementations and the effects on populations’ physical and social
vulnerability.
3. Form an engaged and trained team of citizen scientists that can strengthen
community-based slope and precipitation monitoring, establish baseline data
to improve landslide forecasting models, and communicate hazard
information effectively to the public and relevant institutions.
These goals were attained by focusing on four main project objectives:
1. Determine what strategies are currently being used by institutions in El
Salvador to make advancements toward risk reduction and evaluate their
effectiveness based on qualitative feedback and ethnographic data gathered
from targeted populations and observations of the crisis management
experience during the October 2011 Tropical Depression 12E emergency.
2. Determine the impact that resettlement policies had on affected residents’
livelihoods, social networks, and aspects of social and physical vulnerability
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through participant observation, semi-structured interviews, and document
review.
3. Use a combination of precipitation monitoring and geophysical methods to
help better characterize slope stability at San Vicente Volcano.
4. Integrate the results from characterization of slopes with
institutional/community involvement in risk reduction efforts and outreach
through participatory monitoring exercises and training programs led by the
Universidad de El Salvador.

1.5 Dissertation Outline
The following three chapters detail the methods, results, and interpretations of: 1)
how DRR efforts evolved in San Vicente after Hurricane Ida; 2) the complexities of
relocating at-risk communities; and 3) geophysical research and outreach activities which
strive to improve our understanding of hazard triggers at San Vicente volcano while
educating decision-makers and the public alike. The focus is on the experiences of the
2009 Hurricane Ida and the 2011 Tropical Depression 12E disasters because these events
spurred changes in the existing management system and provided valuable learning
opportunities to evaluate strengths and weaknesses in disaster preparedness and
management, establish a collaborative DRR working group, direct university research
towards slope stability and debris-flow hazard assessment, and analyze the impacts of
resettlement policies in a post-disaster context. Synopses of the following three chapters
are provided below in an attempt to synthesize the results and interpretations culminating
from this body of work.

1.5.1 Chapter 2: University Contributions to Risk Reduction following a
Disaster: A Case Study of Reorienting Natural Hazards Research
Efforts at San Vicente Volcano, El Salvador
Bowman et al. (in review) uses qualitative research methods like participant
observation, semi-structured interviews, and document review to analyze the evolution of
DRR in San Vicente. Faculty at the Universidad de El Salvador – Facultad
17

Multidisciplinaria Paracentral (UES-FMP), which is located in the city of San Vicente,
experienced the tragedy firsthand and perceived that chaotic project implementation,
redundant objectives among various groups, and poor coordination hindered the
effectiveness of pre-event DRR efforts. This paper highlights how the UES-FMP became
a leader in the San Vicente region to help strengthen collaborative networks between
disaster risk reduction institutions through its formation of a 5-month-long disaster risk
reduction training program. The UES-FMP also directs new research efforts to better
characterize landslide triggers, land-use changes, the local watershed and flooding
hazards, meteorological data, and specific factors contributing to vulnerability and risk.
The UES-FMP continues to lead training programs toward reducing disaster risk and has
established El Salvador’s first ever Master’s degree program in disaster risk management.

1.5.2 Chapter 3: Disaster risk reduction and resettlement efforts at San
Vicente (Chichontepec) Volcano, El Salvador: toward
understanding social and geophysical vulnerability
Bowman and Henquinet (2015) use ethnographic methods within the heavily
damaged community of Verapaz to analyze local residents’ perceptions of a relocation
scheme and new monitoring strategies designed to reduce physical vulnerability to debris
flows. Verapaz was completely destroyed in 2009, and the community quickly became
the “poster community” of the Hurricane Ida debris flow disaster. This work builds on
Bowman (2009) and Bowman and White (2012), which explored community perceptions
of NGO-directed disaster mitigation efforts at Santa Ana volcano. This publication
demonstrates that aspects of social vulnerability related to relocation were not adequately
considered, as the majority of homes deemed “uninhabitable” continue to be occupied by
residents. Residents who received a new home have developed unanticipated strategies to
diversify livelihoods and reduce risk to disasters. New monitoring strategies include
networks of rainfall gauges, weather stations, and communication hubs to more
effectively disseminate near-real-time hazard conditions to authorities and the public.
These efforts were more successful at involving and empowering at-risk residents within
the multi-institutional strategy to reduce disaster risk. This case is a prime example
illustrating the pitfalls and unintended consequences of top-down DRR project designs
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that do not adequately consider livelihoods nor the importance of social networks, yet
also highlights residents’ adaptive strategies in light of unfavorable disaster reduction
policy.

1.5.3 Chapter 4: Interpreting saturation changes as a potential factor in
shallow, rainfall-induced landslides from time-lapse seismic
refraction, San Vicente Volcano, El Salvador
Bowman et al. (2015) describes the results of time-lapse seismic refraction field
work conducted on the northern slopes of San Vicente volcano in an effort to determine
whether changing water table depths throughout fluctuating seasonal precipitation might
have implications for slope stability and shallow landslide triggers. Data were acquired
during two field campaigns in May and November 2013 marking the end of the dry
season and end of the wet season, respectively. The results demonstrated survey
repeatability and a validation of methods used, however saturated layers and perched
water tables, which were hypothesized to be a contributing factor to rainfall-induced
landslide generation, were not able to be imaged as seismic velocities throughout all
imaged seismic refractors were similar in both campaigns.

1.6 Conclusions
Decades of different internationally accepted plans to reduce disaster risk have
been put in place, but further refinement of strategies continues. Most recently, the UN
Sendai Framework was ratified in March 2015. This resolution emphasizes that effective
disaster risk reduction relies on coordination mechanisms with relevant stakeholders,
including academia, at all levels to ensure mutual outreach, sustainable partnership, and
complementarity in roles and accountability.
The Agricultural Sciences department at UES-FMP in San Vicente is one
example that demonstrates the level of cooperation recommended within the new
framework’s design for effective DRR. Agricultural engineers at the UES-FMP served as
mentors and partners throughout the research included in this dissertation. Since the 2009
disaster, the following aspects related to DRR in San Vicente have become clearer.
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The UES-FMP shifted research and training activities towards DRR themes and
has evolved as the region’s unbiased partner to help coordinate and lead DRR efforts.
Tropical Depression 12E in 2011 occurred during the UES-FMP emergency management
certificate training program and provided real-life, hands-on experience for participants
to engage in risk reduction efforts. This experience helped identify weaknesses to the
existing communication protocol, which were remedied in the months following the
emergency. The emergency also provided an opportunity to clarify DRR practitioners’
roles and responsibilities during hazard events.
UES-FMP-led projects promote inclusion of State institutions at national and
local levels and incorporate sectors proportionately affected by disasters, especially the
rural poor. The results from ethnographic research conducted in Verapaz demonstrated
that residents’, sheltering, relocation, and residence behavior differed from institutions’
desired outcomes because project designs did not sufficiently address residents’ concerns
related to aspects of social vulnerability like livelihoods, family networks, and proximity
to agricultural lands. Results of the Verapaz study and ongoing UES-FMP projects
highlight the importance of designing future projects with a full consideration of these
elements, which brings social vulnerability into a broader regional discussion.
Partnerships with national and international aid organizations, universities, and local
governmental institutions are key to help sustain ongoing DRR training and certificate
programs, as well as new areas of hazard research and monitoring. Five years of
collaborative efforts to enhance San Vicente’s ability to reduce disaster risk has resulted
in El Salvador’s first-ever certified Master’s degree program in Disaster Risk
Management at UES-FMP. This step represents a restructuring of the University by
integrating disciplines to develop a new curriculum and program to meet the needs of the
region. Through the academic program, new research and trained individuals will help
further address risk issues throughout El Salvador.
An effort to better understand the relationship between seasonal precipitation and
water table depth did not indicate that impermeable layers are present to create perched
water tables that could trigger shallow landslides. Though data obtained did not image
saturated layers, repeatability between surveys showed that the time-lapse seismic
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refraction methods worked well in the volcanic terrain. Changing field campaign design
might bolster future results if survey sites were reoccupied under different conditions,
especially if campaigns could be performed soon after periods of heavy precipitation and
combined with other geophysical methods like resistivity.
The region surrounding San Vicente volcano has a long history of natural
catastrophes and is now receiving systematic attention towards hazard mitigation
planning. Improving DRR for the region is an iterative process where the practitioners
use data, observations, and experiences to identify areas to improve the current system
and better prepare for future hazard events. Experiences from the San Vicente case can be
applied to improve DRR and hazard research efforts in other areas.
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Chapter 2: University contributions to risk reduction following
a disaster: A case study of reorienting natural hazards
research efforts at San Vicente volcano, El Salvador
Abstract
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts and research are lacking in many hazard-prone
areas around the globe. Governmental initiatives in El Salvador recently sought to
address challenges to disaster and emergency management that became evident following
a series of disasters spanning 1998 to 2005. The region surrounding San Vicente volcano,
El Salvador, has a long history of natural catastrophes and yet, until recently, has
received little systematic attention towards hazard mitigation planning. The debris-flow
disaster in November 2009, triggered by rains from Hurricane Ida, was the first time the
country systems were needed, and an in-depth review of the evolution of these systems is
the focus of this paper. Faculty at the Universidad de El Salvador – Facultad
Multidisciplinaria Paracentral (UES-FMP), which is located in the city of San Vicente,
experienced the tragedy firsthand and perceived that chaotic project implementation,
redundant objectives among various groups, and poor coordination hindered the
effectiveness of pre-event DRR efforts. Poor potential-hazard awareness, no warning and
monitoring systems, and unclear crisis-response responsibilities all contributed to over
200 deaths in the region. Faculty group then led a comprehensive community effort to
identify weaknesses and plan better for the next catastrophe. Their approach
encompassed conceiving and implementing research, field, and training activities for
improving hazard understanding and communication in order to better inform decision
makers and the public. UES-FMP partnered with research and development groups to
gather hydrometeorological data, model hazards, and train local stakeholders. UES-FMP
encourages DRR practitioners to focus on interdisciplinary methods to help guide project
design. Experiences from San Vicente can be applied to improve DRR and hazard
research efforts in other areas.

Based on: Bowman, L., Gierke, J.S., Cruz Centeno, J.F., in review. University contributions to risk
reduction in a post-disaster context: A case study of reorienting research efforts at San Vicente volcano, El
Salvador. Geological Society of America Special Volume, Geoscience for the Public Good.
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2.1. Introduction
Since the declaration of the International Decade of Natural Disaster Reduction
(IDNDR) in the 1990s, many Latin American countries have tried to improve their ability
to minimize the impacts of hazardous events. Corominas and Marti (2015) detail specific
policy advancements in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Chile over the
last two decades to meet the disaster risk reduction goals proposed in both the IDNDR
and the Hyogo Framework for Action. The higher frequency and greater impacts in
higher population densities in El Salvador have led to further institutional and policy
changes to better address systematic weaknesses that become apparent in the aftermath of
a disaster.
El Salvador has 20 potentially active volcanoes, six of which have had significant
eruptions in the last 125 years (Global Volcanism Program 2015). Though San Vicente
volcano (known locally as Chichontepec: 13.5950° N, 88.8370° W) has had no historical
eruptions, it is the site of at least seven debris-flow events (Major et al. 2004; Smith
2012; Barrera and Guevara 2008). Several recent major disasters in El Salvador have led
to policy changes within the national government to reduce the risks to life and property
from natural hazards. After Hurricane Mitch (1998), El Salvador experienced two deadly
earthquakes in 2001 (M 7.7 on January 13 and M6.6 on February 13) causing heavy
human (1,159 people killed) and economic losses ($1.2 billion US) (Marti and Jovel
2004; Wisner 2002; Jibson et al. 2004). The Servicio Nacional de Estudios Territoriales
(SNET, National Service for Territorial Studies) was formed as a result in order to
improve environmental monitoring and forecasting capabilities to better prepare for
hazardous geological and hydrometeorological events. The crisis forecasting and warning
capabilities of SNET were first tested in 2005 when Santa Ana volcano erupted (Volcanic
Explosive Index of 3) on October 1 and Hurricane Stan on October 2. The rains caused
flooding, landslides, and debris flows. Recognizing the need for more centralized crisis
response, the government then formed Protección Civil (Civil Protection: CP, hereafter)
to complement the forecasting and warning responsibilities of SNET. CP was charged
with preparing communities for hazardous events, communicating hazard information
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provided by SNET, declaring emergency alerts, and responding to communities in need
following disasters.
The emergency systems and procedures developed by SNET and CP were not
needed until the 2009 Hurricane Ida debris flow disaster at San Vicente volcano. Heavy
rainfall from Hurricane Ida, starting in El Salvador on 7 November 2009 and increasing
for two days, triggered landslides and debris flows on 8 November that killed more than
200 people and caused considerable damage to infrastructure in the five municipalities on
the northern flank of the volcano. The DRR efforts fell short in many respects. No
warnings and poor preparedness were evident throughout the unfolding of the disaster.
Even alerts regarding the emergency were not issued until the morning after the event
(Bowman and Henquinet 2015; Tellman 2011). Communities and institutions were not
adequately prepared for responding in terms of communicating warnings and
preparations for responding to events, coordinating evacuations, preparing emergency
shelters, etc. (Bowman and Henquinet 2015).
After the 2009 disaster, many new and revised structural and organizational
changes were promulgated nationally and locally to avoid similar shortcomings in the
future. The disaster spurred a significant aid response from governmental and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), university groups, and aid organizations first
dedicated to immediate relief for victims and reconstruction and then directed toward
disaster risk reduction (DRR) efforts. Since the Universidad de El Salvador – Facultad
Multidisciplinaria Paracentral (UES-FMP) is located in the town of San Vicente and was
frequently used as a resource for information and support from arriving aid institutions, it
became evident to several faculty that many DRR institutions competed for resources and
had redundant, overlapping objectives. Similarly, there was very little inter-institutional
collaboration and little sharing of project objectives and results.
UES-FMP used a two-pronged approach to learn from the catastrophe and
improve future disaster management cooperation by: 1) soliciting support from
international research and development groups to improve effectiveness of DRR
institutions, and 2) reorienting their university research to improve hazard understanding
and communication in order to better inform decision makers. By partnering with
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apolitical international research and development groups, UES-FMP plays an integral
role in gathering hydrometeorological data, modeling hazard scenarios, training local
students and technicians, and communicating results. To this end, UES-FMP contributes
to DRR efforts by encouraging DRR practitioners from NGOs (e.g., Peace Corps, local
and international university researchers, United Nations volunteers, Korea International
Cooperation Agency, etc.) and governmental organizations (e.g., National Civilian
Police, CP, municipal environmental technicians, etc.) to focus less on rapid project
development/implementation and more on using background information to guide quality
project design. Observations and recommendations from the San Vicente experience can
be applied to improve DRR efforts in other areas.
This paper outlines the evolution of actions taken to identify and address the
institutional weaknesses evident from the 2009 lahar disaster triggered by Hurricane Ida,
and it provides a firsthand review of the effectiveness of the new systems and procedures
during Tropical Depression 12E in October 2011. Unaddressed communication problems
apparent after Hurricane Ida proved challenging again during Tropical Depression 12E,
as well as the importance of establishing baseline data and more hazards-focused
research. Continued commitment towards addressing these issues is needed, but the
partnerships and collaborative efforts have led to important improvements in
communication, coordination, and data gathering. What follows is a case study that
highlights a suite of critical components for more effective DRR planning and
management.

2.2 Background and Methods
El Salvador has had a long history of disasters as a result of its tropical latitude and
precarious tectonic position adjacent to the convergent plate margin where the Cocos
plate actively subducts beneath the Caribbean plate (Figure 2.1). Earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, landslides, tsunamis, floods and droughts are hazards faced by this small,
densely populated developing nation. The potential frequency and severity of these
hazards make citizens of El Salvador the eighth most vulnerable in the world according to
the World Risk Report (Mucke et al. 2014).
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The aforementioned series of recent disasters brought risk issues to the forefront
of national discussion and policy. As a demonstration of its commitment to improve
hazard forecasting and emergency management, the national government created SNET
in 2001 so as to better monitor potentially hazardous geological and meteorological
phenomena. In 2005, the Salvadoran Congress passed a law creating a new Civil
Protection institution charged with communicating information generated by SNET,
responding to communities affected by disasters, and preparing the population for future
hazard events.

Figure 2.1 Plate Boundaries and Volcanic Front of El Salvador (Modified from Scripps
Institution of Oceanography 2012). The location of San Vicente volcano is indicated with
a black star.
After both of these new agencies operated for several years, the first major
disaster occurred as a result of heavy rains from Hurricane Ida at the end of the rainy
season in 2009 (Figure 2). In less than 36 hours, 7-9 November 2009, 450 mm (355 mm
over a period of five hours) of rain fell on the already saturated slopes of San Vicente
volcano, triggering shallow landslides (CEPAL 2010; Government of El Salvador 2009).
These mass movements bulked and behaved as debris flows in the steeply incised
channels on the northern flank of the volcano. Volumes of these flows (estimated to be
more than 350,000 m3) were greater than the channels could convey, thereby inundating
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the less-steep, more-populated alluvial areas (Government of El Salvador 2009; Schweig
et al. 2010). Debris flows of this magnitude had not occurred in the region since 1934,
which was long enough ago that memories of the previous disaster had mostly faded and
drainages slowly aggraded. Local residents, especially poorer families without access to
fertile, safe land, had begun living on and farming these areas, mostly in the town of
Verapaz (Bowman and Henquinet 2015). By 2009, entire neighborhoods, including
churches and clinics, had been constructed on top of the 1934 lahar deposits. Though
SNET had forecasted hurricane-level rain, CP’s warning mechanism (color-coded
warnings ranging in order of increasing severity: Green, Yellow, Orange, and Red)
remained at Green (lowest level) and no warning or evacuation was issued. The
magnitude of the event was completely unforeseen, catching both national and local
governmental institutions by surprise. CP did not issue an Orange alert (which “mobilizes
civil authorities, the armed forces and police and fire departments and all humanitarian
agencies working in the affected regions to prepare for evacuations, equip places of
refuge and maintain public order”) until the morning after the disaster when it was too
late for many of the victims (Tellman 2010; Fagen 2008: 11).

Figure 2.2 Hurricane Ida aftermath in the town of Verapaz. The first photo is taken
downstream from the destroyed bridge over Quebradona Creek. The second photo shows
damaged homes and debris flow deposits on a main road in Verapaz downstream from
where the lahar left the Quebradona Creek channel. (Photo credit: Jose Fredy Cruz
Centeno).
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Five municipalities (Guadalupe, Verapaz, Tepetitán, San Cayetano/Istepeque, and
San Vicente) were most heavily impacted by the debris flows (Figure 3). The southern
portion of Verapaz and marginalized populations along the Acahuapa River banks in San
Vicente city were completely destroyed, and entire neighborhoods were swept away or
buried in debris. In total, official estimates of fatalities reached more than 200
individuals, and unofficial estimates were more than twice the official but went
uncounted for they were never recovered (Protección Civil 2009). In addition to the
homes and buildings that were destroyed, crops and infrastructure were also heavily
damaged, totaling more than $314 million (El Salvador uses USA currency, so dollar
figures herein are all in US dollars) in losses, which is more than 1.4% of the country’s
gross domestic product (Government of El Salvador 2009). Unfortunately, part of the
lack of investment in DRR initiatives and proper preparedness plans can be attributed to
poor management of relief funds, decentralization of state institutions, and even
corruption (cf. Tellman (2011) for a complete review). For example, former El
Salvadoran president Francisco Flores was recently indicted on corruption charges for
misuse of $15 million of disaster aid between 1999 and 2004 after Hurricane Mitch and
the two earthquakes in 2001 (Renteria 2014).
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Figure 2.3 Map of El Salvador and inset of San Vicente volcano, encompassing 5 focus
municipalities (Modified from Smith et al 2015).
In the aftermath of the 2009 lahar disaster, many governmental and
nongovernmental organizations invested money in DRR efforts in the five
aforementioned municipalities. International and national aid arrived within days and
continued for weeks. Within two months, many short-medium term projects were
underway. Agricultural engineers working for UES-FMP (Professor Fredy Cruz Centeno)
and CEPRODE (Rutilio Antonio Parada Galan) remembered that the hasty arrival of aid
led to project objectives that often overlapped and increased competition for resources
and community support (Parada Galan, personal communication, May 30, 2012).
Recognizing this organizational weakness, faculty from the Agricultural Sciences
department of UES-FMP began soliciting international support from the U.S. Peace
Corps Response and Korea International Cooperation (KOICA) volunteer programs.
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The Geological and Mining Engineering and Sciences department at Michigan
Technological University (Michigan Tech) began a Peace Corps Masters International
(PCMI) program in Mitigation of Natural Hazards in 2004 (cf. Tubman et al. (this issue)).
Three Michigan Tech PCMI students previously served in El Salvador, and one regular
M.S. student spent five months on his thesis project related to disaster prevention and
mitigation at Santa Ana volcano in early 2009, prior to the San Vicente lahar disaster.
Bowman and White (2012) highlighted NGO challenges in a post-disaster context with
affected residents who demonstrated community priorities that differed vastly from NGO
objectives. Subsequently, this student, who is lead author of this work, began doctoral
studies focusing on the November 2009 lahar disaster at San Vicente volcano. Previous
field research provided the necessary background required to fulfil the needs requested by
UES-FMP and Peace Corps Response—El Salvador at San Vicente volcano. The data
and observations in this paper originate from research conducted with UES-FMP for a
total 15-month-long field season. Agricultural engineers from the Agricultural Sciences
department at UES-FMP originally defined project and research objectives around: 1)
strengthening institutional collaboration; 2) identifying community leaders and local
stakeholders; 3) designing formal emergency management training activities for residents
and institutional representatives; 4) advising UES-FMP students in DRR-based thesis
projects; and 5) identifying research priorities regarding natural hazards threatening the
population around San Vicente volcano.
Concomitantly, Peace Corps—El Salvador created a new, one-of-a-kind volunteer
program titled Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DPM) and invited two additional
Michigan Tech PCMI students to help train and prepare communities to reduce disaster
risk. The development of a new Peace Corps program that recruits and trains DPM
volunteers further demonstrates the development sector’s need to incorporate grassroots
DRR efforts in rural communities throughout El Salvador.
The data collected for this analysis was obtained through several ethnographic
tools. Participant observation was carried out during a 15-month-long field season where
observations were made during community meetings, field trips, certificate program
courses, and the management of the Tropical Depression 12E emergency. Semi33

structured interviews of 11 DRR practitioners involved in the post-Ida recovery and
management of Tropical Depression 12E emergency from both NGO and GO sectors
were conducted, transcribed, and coded using Atlas.ti qualitative data processing
software in order to identify recurring themes regarding disaster management and the
evolution of disaster risk reduction in the San Vicente region. Detailed field notes were
taken to help triangulate data from what was observed in the participant observation and
the information and ideas gathered in interviews. Finally, additional information was
gathered through document review from NGO and GO project publications and the
media.

2.3. Results
UES-FMP Agricultural Sciences faculty provided their expertise to the GO and
NGO DRR institutions arriving and working in San Vicente. As self-appointed, apolitical
liaisons for a variety of new projects, Agricultural Engineer and UES-FMP professor,
Fredy Cruz Centeno (co-author of this work), mentored PCR and KOICA volunteers to
help coordinate and restructure the implementation of institutional efforts18 months after
the Hurricane Ida disaster (April 2011). The following reflections and results of the
ethnographic data chronologically detail the steps taken with regard to stakeholder and
community leader identification, training of local emergency managers and volcano
observers, active participation in a real-life emergency management scenario, and the
evolution of research activities. Initially, all stakeholder priorities revolved around
addressing the lack of preparedness experienced in 2009. Greater interest was given to
geologic field research after the Tropical Depression 12E emergency in October 2011.
The results also describe the growing network of external support that aided both
institutional coordination and the geohydrological research efforts that broaden the
understanding of hazards and vulnerability.
UES-FMP and the San Vicente Civil Protection brigade organized a multiinstitutional meeting in May 2011 to review the recently revised plan titled (Plan
Invernal), “Rainy Season Plan.” Government and CP representatives from each of the
five heavily-damaged municipalities, as well as individuals from the Red Cross, CARE
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international, Habitat for Humanity, Centro de Protección para Desastres (CEPRODE,
Center for Disaster Protection), the Fundación de Desarrollo (FUNDE, Foundation for
Development), and local police and fire departments. This gathering was used by UESFMP to present itself as a resource to be used by regional practitioners and explain its
plan to develop a five-month diplomado Certificate program for combined classroom and
field courses focused on hazard assessment, risk reduction, and emergency management
and response. Public response to this idea was overwhelming, and FUNDE and
CEPRODE acquired additional resources for the development of this course over the
following three months.
In August 2011, 54 participants began the diploma program. Enrollment was
capped to accommodate the physical space available for the courses and to facilitate the
field activities. Students consisted of UES-FMP recent graduates, community leaders
from all five municipalities, CP technicians, NGO representatives, National Civilian
Police and Fire Department officers, Peace Corps trainers, Brazilian technicians from a
United Nations Development Program project, and municipal employees from Natural
Resource and Environment sectors. Coursework and trainings held by experts and
certified emergency management trainers made up the majority of the first three months.
These lessons included curricula and certifications approved by USAID regarding:
Management of Centers for Emergency Operations (MACOE); Evaluation of Damages
and Needs (EDAN); management of shelters; aid distribution; and Early Warning
Systems (EWS). A crisis simulation exercise was planned to conclude this portion of the
program in order for each student to practice a role and assume a responsibility while
managing a hypothetical crisis. This simulation was never performed because Tropical
Depression 12E arrived and provided an opportunity to put into practice what had been
learned. Classes for the program were suspended during the emergency but resumed
through December 2011.

2.3.1 Tropical Depression 12E
On 10 October 2011 Tropical Depression 12E entered El Salvador causing nearly
continuous rainfall for 12 days and produced rainfall accumulations that equaled the
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devastating amounts from Hurricane Mitch in 1988 (International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2011). Many areas reported rainfall accumulations
surpassing annual rainfall averages—up to 1400 mm of precipitation. During this
emergency, CP established Centros de Operaciones de Emergencias (COEs) in
municipalities throughout the country. COEs are standard CP protocol and are the
mechanisms by which CP coordinates and controls all operations during emergencies,
which facilitates “an efficient response to any incident and allows inter-institutional
resources to be used in an efficient manner” (Ministerio de Gobernación y Desarrollo
Territorial 2012). By October 18, CP reported 32 deaths due to landslides and flooding
throughout El Salvador. In San Vicente and the surrounding municipalities, this was the
first time that newly trained individuals assumed the responsibility of managing a real
emergency in the COEs.
Since a simulation could not be performed prior to the arrival of TD12E, the first
three days of COE management proved chaotic because of poor or delayed
communication, confusion about individual roles and responsibilities, and general
inexperience of managers. My (LB) own observations regarding this experience were
gathered from my participation in the emergency management and follow-up interviews
with participating DRR practitioners. This example, translated from a Spanish-language
interview, reflects the confusion and challenges activating the proper COE protocol
during the first days of the emergency:
We had just finished the “Center for Emergency Operations Management”
training program. Students had the tools, but they didn’t feel self-assured. I had to
get involved because they were not well-organized. Our NGO is not geared for
actual response—we are trainers and facilitators. Our role is to assess our
program, and we recommended that the action plan had to change, so we
recommended to the mayor and police chief to activate the COE protocol. The
management team chose a leader and divided responsibilities. At this point, they
[the students/team members] put their training into practice and they realized that
this methodology works—what you need to have is confidence that the
management plan can be executed, and that was demonstrated that day and
throughout the rest of the emergency. That was one of the biggest successes of our
project, because training, training, and more training is one thing, but to put that
knowledge to the test during an emergency is the true goal. NGO Technician
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Early in the crisis, CEPRODE took an active role in reminding managers of their training
and responsibilities which helped establish a coherent framework for communication as
well as a hierarchy of management—all concepts that were part of the Diploma program.
One CEPRODE technician summed up their role in the COE by saying:
Our role during the crisis [Tropical Depression 12E] was to unite a variety of
institutions with the University of El Salvador…and provide logistical and
assessment support when the COEs were established. This case was interesting
because we had just finished our training in how to manage Centers for
Emergency Operations, but we had not yet had a simulation exercise to test the
students’ knowledge, and we had not provided the training about shelters and
evacuations. So this gave us the opportunity to put into practice the knowledge
and training that we had provided. Our donors [USAID and Lutheran World
Relief] were very content that participants were able to be involved with a reallife emergency. NGO Technician
After this mid-emergency intervention, operations ran more smoothly. Shelters
were constructed, at-risk families were evacuated, food and other aid were effectively
distributed, and hourly precipitation data were reported from local observers and
municipal weather stations to the CP authorities helping to manage the COEs. The
duration of the yellow and orange alert status (11 days) required that COE managers
work in 12-hour shifts, resulting in ample experience for each of the Diploma students
involved. The event provided a perfect platform for the students to put into practice the
theoretical management skills learned in the training program, as well as identify
weaknesses that could be improved upon during future emergencies.
After the emergency concluded, and the diploma course resumed normal
programming, students that took part in the emergency management, lecturers, and fieldtrip leaders referred to the Tropical Depression 12E experience and focused on
addressing some of the structural weaknesses that were discovered. For example,
CEPRODE worked alongside CP to improve the communication network. One
CEPRODE employee recalls the communication challenges during the TD12E
management and the importance of integrating the network with CP:
The first thing we realized is that our communication system [local observers to
Civil Protection] failed. We had to insist before the National Commission that
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they approve the same frequencies [for local observers] as the frequencies used by
Civil Protection. During the emergency, they had to use cell phones [instead of
radios] but few people have money for that. If users don’t have minutes on their
[prepaid] phone, the system failed. Our project could supply minutes to the users,
but what happens when our project is over? The whole communication system
breaks down. We addressed that weakness by coordinating with Civil Protection
and getting the [two-way] radio frequencies approved for the communication
network. CEPRODE Employee
Though TD12E induced problematic flooding in parts of San Vicente, the storm
triggered only small landslides primarily at road cuts. At the end of the crisis, there were
no casualties in the focus area. The magnitude of the event cannot be compared to the
crisis experienced during Hurricane Ida in 2009; however, the effectiveness of the
network of local observers, increased awareness of the public, improved preparedness by
local residents, and efficiencies of the managing institutions were apparent. Weaknesses
in the system were identified, which provided an opportunity for further improvements.
2.3.1.1 Local Observers
An especially important outcome of this event was the receipt of reports from
recently trained local observers strategically located on the upper flanks of San Vicente.
CEPRODE and CP efforts to incorporate local residents into a precipitation and slope
monitoring network proved extremely beneficial. At least seven surface cracks had
formed (or became apparent) during the storm. These cracks tended to occur along the
tops of ridges or along contours on the upslope regions of agricultural fields and coffee
plantations. All of their orientations suggested the potential for onset of mass movements.
Local observers used two-way radios (provided by CEPRODE) to report the phenomena
to CP authorities. CP sought assistance from UES-FMP and CEPRODE, so a field
campaign was organized with some of the Diploma students to measure horizontal and
vertical displacement of the cracks, as well as to georeference each location. One month
later, UES-FMP faculty and collaborators organized a geophysical field campaign using
seismic refraction and resistivity methods in an attempt to characterize bedrock and water
table depths in areas where surface water runoff infiltrated surficial cracks that appeared
during Tropical Depression 12E. These cracks were suspected as places for potential
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slope failure and of particular concern to the local observers who discovered them. Seven
such areas were visited, georeferenced, and measured. The geophysical surveys were
conducted only once and thus were inconclusive, but the group activity did contribute to
strengthening interagency cooperation through the opportunity to work on the issue in a
hands-on fashion, while providing benchmark data for future monitoring of slope
movement.

2.3.1.2

Weather Station Network

Rainfall intensity and accumulation data from local observers helped CP and the
COEs. CEPRODE secured funding from the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) to install a Davis Vantage Vue weather station at each of the five
municipal government buildings where the COEs are established during emergencies. An
additional weather station was installed at UES-FMP campus. At times when the system
has been fully operational, this monitoring advancement provided real time precipitation
data, further strengthening CP’s ability to warn communities in a timely manner. Even
when the real-time internet uploading service is down, local observers can report data
directly observed from their respective station to CP and COE managers.
Michigan Tech provided server space in 2013 to UES-FMP and CEPRODE in
order to create an online platform to host all meteorological data. The system has been
wrought with problems, mostly due to internet security reasons. Michigan Tech and UESFMP Information Technology personnel continue towards solving the problems so that
the public will have continuous access to real-time and historic meteorological data. In
the meantime, each municipality's COE has access to the weather station data for
reporting purposes during emergencies.

2.3.2 Post 12E Efforts
Tropical Depression 12E demonstrated the importance of inter-institutional
communication and data sharing, which further strengthened support for the UES-FMP
goal to improve DRR collaborations. The positive momentum initiated with the Diploma
program and annealed by the TD12E crisis continued following the management of
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TD12E and was used during the following dry season to address the weaknesses
identified during TD12E, as well as prioritize research efforts and solicit additional
resources and support for continued efforts. Besides improved communication between
local observers, municipality COEs, and CP for reporting rainfall and hazard conditions
via the two-radio system, new research projects ensued to better understand slope
stability and encourage citizen involvement with field campaigns.
Given the evident landslide hazard and the flooding that had occurred during
TD12E, UES-FMP developed a proposal for the National Science Foundation
(NSF)/United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Partnerships for
Enhanced Engagement in Research (PEER) program. By partnering with Michigan Tech,
UES-FMP was eligible to apply for research funding that was in support of the
development goals of USAID. Their proposal, titled “Demonstrating the integration of
ground-based monitoring and satellite remote sensing for forecasting landslides and
flooding hazards in volcanic terrains,” was funded in April 2012 and provided funding
for field and distance learning equipment and travel for a remote sensing and hazard
modeling workshop at Michigan Tech.
Additionally, scientists from the US Geological Survey (USGS) and SNET
organized a hazard modelling workshop in January 2012, which provided tools and
fostered skills for practitioners in San Vicente to develop locally-appropriate hazard maps
for targeted, at-risk communities. CEPRODE, with assistance from UES-FMP faculty
and Michigan Tech, developed five municipality-scale multi-hazard maps to serve as
guides during DRR effort implementation and to assist decision makers during crises
(Figure 4). Shortly after, in May 2012, a student from Michigan Tech conducted
fieldwork at the 2009 landslide initiation points on San Vicente volcano to model the
susceptibility of slope failure due to intense rainfall. The results from this study suggested
that shallow water tables were a contributing factor to rainfall-induced landslides (Smith
et al. 2015). Practically no information exists as to the depths to the groundwater table
and bedrock on San Vicente volcano, so geophysical surveys were performed to examine
the potential that bedrock is shallow and shallow perched aquifers could form during
rainy seasons (Bowman et al., in preparation).
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Figure 2.4 Example hazard map for San Vicente Municipality’s urban area showing
streets, creeks, rivers, and neighborhood boundaries with debris flow (of hypothetical
volumes) inundation zones overlapping the base map.
The Smith et al. (2015) results led to an effort by Michigan Tech and UES-FMP
researchers to use geophysical methods to monitor water table depths at three locations
nearest to the 2009 slope failures. A host of local institutions conducted two field
campaigns in May and November 2013—months marking the end of the dry season and
end of rainy season, respectively. Seismic refraction surveys were successful at
identifying stratigraphic layers; however, 2013 and 2012 proved to be a relatively dry
years, so though the methods worked and the results show distinct layers, it was
impossible to distinguish water table depth or depths of perched aquifers (Bowman et al.,
in preparation).
In March 2013, PEER-related activities began with the installation of Solinst
leveloggers in five hand-dug wells located across the central portion of the Acahuapa
River watershed. Pumping tests were conducted to measure hydraulic conductivities of
the shallow aquifers. Additional PEER research was paired with geophysical field
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campaigns in 2013. The network of monitored wells was coupled with two additional
leveloggers installed within the upper and lower portions of the Acahuapa River to serve
as stream gages to monitor seasonal changes in streamflow. This data, combined with
meteorological data provided by the weather station network, will be used to create a
water budget and model hydrologic conditions of the northern flank of San Vicente
volcano to improve flooding hazard models and forecasts.
Research activities continued through 2013 with three additional visits to UESFMP by Michigan Tech faculty and students, including currently serving PCMI
volunteers. Furthermore, a UES-FMP Agricultural Sciences professor (FC) visited
Michigan Tech for a customized remote sensing/hazard modeling workshop. Table 1
provides a synthesis of how DRR-related activities have evolved in El Salvador from
1998 through present day. Three years of collaboration after Hurricane Ida has resulted in
a newly trained and tested group of emergency management practitioners, in-place
weather and hydrological monitoring equipment, a classroom equipped with new
computers, ArcGIS licenses and plotter, as well as video-conferencing equipment to
continue distance learning initiatives between UES-FMP and Michigan Tech.
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T, R
E
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(R)

2
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E
T, E
T, R
E
R, E
E
I

I
I
I
I
I
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E
E
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E

I

I9

R, E7
E
E

E5
E
E

E
E

E

PEER/PIRE
(UES-FMP &
Michigan
Tech)

R, E
E
E

R5

E3

UES-FMP,
2005 Santa
2012 Post 12E
Analysis of
Michigan Tech, 2011 Tropical
M 7.7 & 6.6
Ana Eruption Systems in Place 2009 Hurricane Ida
Efforts (USGS,
CEPRODE, Peace Depression
Earthquakes 2001 and Hurricane for 2005 Santa
Triggered Lahars
SNET, UES-FMP,
12E
Corps, KOICA
Stan
Michigan Tech)
Ana Lahar
Partnerships

Several government organizations were reorganized under the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources
Bowman and White (2012)
3
Civil Protection and Salvadoran NGOs continue to collaborate through trainings and field courses
4
Lechner et al (2013)
5
Santa Ana volcano GPS network was reoccupied; San Miguel volcano GPS network established for first time
6
Bowman and Henquinet (in review)
7
Cruz, J.F. et al (2013)
8
Smith et al. (2014); USGS/SNET LaharZ workshop; Surface crack monitoring; Seismic refraction campaigns; Training at Michigan Tech
9
Cruz, J.F. et al (2013)

1

Vulnerability Analysis and Population Relocation Study
MOU Development and Institutional Coordination
Hazard Modeling and Remote Sensing Skill Development
Weather Station Network
Collaborative Modeling and Field Characterization of Landslide
8
Susceptibility
Watershed Monitoring & Hydrological Modeling

6

Servico Nacional de Estudios Territoriales (SNET)
Proteccion Civil (Civil Protection)
Municipal Civil Protection Brigades and NGO DRR Efforts
GPS Volcano Deformation Monitoring
Risk Reduction Diploma Program
Centers for Emergency Operations (COE) Formation

Center for Geotechnical Research

DRR System/Activity Description

Event Spurring DRR System/Activity/Evolution

Table 2.1 Status Summary of El Salvadoran DRR Systems. (T = Tested; R = Restructured; E = Evolving; I = Initiated)

2.4 Discussion
The unbiased position that UES-FMP holds among the stakeholder groups
provided an effective opportunity in San Vicente to serve an important role in
reorganizing and implementing DRR efforts and fostering collaborative relationships
among the institutions working in the region. Municipal government environmental
commissions are important partners in regional DRR projects and crisis management in
El Salvador; however, the five municipalities do not all share the same political
affiliations. The departmental capital, San Vicente, is governed by a mayor from one
political party while the smaller, neighboring municipalities on the northern flank of the
volcano are governed by opposing political parties. The recent history of civil conflict
makes navigating the political differences challenging. Even NGOs working alongside
government offices in one municipality can face challenges when attempting to expand
their target areas if they are associated as supportive of one political party over another.
For this reason, UES-FMP was integral by ensuring that representatives from each
municipal government and organization were involved in training programs, field
campaigns, and policy-making meetings.
A common occurrence in many post-disaster areas is that aid is initially abundant
in the months after a disaster but often quickly runs out as “media coverage wanes and
international attention turns elsewhere” while other priorities emerge and compete for
limited resources (Inderfuth et al. 2005: 4). In San Vicente, financial investment and
resources dedicated specifically to DRR were practically exhausted by August 2012. The
18-month CEPRODE project came to an end in August 2012. KOICA and Peace Corps
Response/Fulbright volunteers/students departed in June and July 2012. A Brazilian team
of United Nations Development Program volunteers focusing on hazard education in
primary schools departed in May 2012. Funding through a Michigan Tech-acquired,
NSF-funded project (Partnerships for International Research and Education: PIRE) and
PEER-related efforts carried on throughout the end of 2013 when both projects
concluded. Projects and funding have finite durations, which emphasizes the importance
of establishing a functioning, sustainable framework so that local institutions will
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continue after external support ends. This reality was apparent to UES-FMP, spurring
them to emplace measures to foster longer-term collaboration.
In November 2011, UES-FMP and Michigan Tech signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) that outlined ways in which both institutions would support each
other throughout the implementation of the funded PEER research initiative. This formal
document was not necessary from Michigan Tech’s perspective, but the official MOU
lends credibility to UES-FMP counterparts and facilitates continued efforts within their
institution’s administration. This document was upgraded in July 2012 to a more formal
agreement that allows for both institutions to work beyond the scope of the previous
research with the aim of continuing collaboration in areas of mutual interest after
expiration of the PEER project. Similarly, UES-FMP established MOUs with CEPRODE
and CP in order for all institutions to more easily access data collected and project results,
as well as to facilitate ongoing trainings in the San Vicente area. These efforts continue
today.
Their leadership role prior to and after the disaster strengthened the ability of
UES-FMP to secure support from other development institutions working in the region.
As funding and interest for continued DRR measures diminished, UES-FMP sustained
the collaborative momentum by developing new partnerships with sustainable
development objectives. UES-FMP created a MOU with The Foundation for Local
Development (Fundación de Desarrollo Local) in order to develop an additional
Diploma program called, “Management of Local Economic Development,” which is
directed at municipal representatives, food/agriculture cooperatives, and organizations
fomenting ecotourism.
UES-FMP established another MOU with the national government’s Ministry of
Housing (Ministerio de Hacienda) regarding a funded initiative called, “Project to
Strengthen Local Governments.” Two additional diploma short courses will be offered in
2015 as a result of this new collaboration--one titled, “Disaster Risk Management and
Municipal Development,” and the other titled, “Economic Development and Sustainable
Management of the Territory.” These two courses are aimed at representatives from
municipal environmental sectors, CP technicians, and municipal offices of economic
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development to help strengthen emergency response and improve strategic urban
development plans.
Local institutions continue developing an information database for the larger
Jiboa River Valley, of which the Acahuapa watershed (and San Vicente) is part, using an
ArcGIS platform to capture, process, and store relevant spatial and temporal data to
improve municipal governments’ access to information. The tool will be especially useful
to identify vulnerable communities during emergencies and distribute resources more
efficiently. Finally, UES-FMP and FUNDE support a grassroots youth development
group and offer a special short course diploma program called, “Youths Transforming
Their Territory.” Each of the aforementioned diploma programs makes use of the newly
equipped computer laboratory made possible by PEER and KOICA funding.
Formal agreements are an important product for academic institutions and
practitioners in developing countries as they solidify partnerships and collaboration. They
affirm longer-term commitments and challenge existing stereotypes that well-funded,
visiting scientists focus solely on personal research goals without further consideration of
broader needs from developing country host institutions (Barrett 2010).

2.5

Conclusions
Formal inter-institutional cooperation between national and international

organizations, local governments, and universities improves the capacity for collaborative
groups to undertake complex risk issues by providing the knowledge, tools, finances, and
human resources to better address these problems. In San Vicente, inclusion of a wide
variety of stakeholders nourished a collaborative environment where participants could
voice ideas, express priorities, and posit solutions.
Involvement in diploma programs, field campaigns, and project planning
meetings were inclusive in order to incorporate a range of participants from different
backgrounds. This strategy is quite intentional given that “continued political polarity
today reduces capacity in disaster response in El Salvador, as coordinating aid across
governance scales (local-municipal-national) complicates distribution and decisionmaking” (Boyce 1995 from Tellman 2011: 37).
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Although theoretically a national ‘system’ in the sense of cooperation among
numerous institutions and levels of government, COEN has remained
centralized—and in the view of opposition political parties, many municipal
mayors and much of civil society—a closed ‘club’ used for distributing relief aid
among supporters of the ruling party. (Wisner 2001: 257)
Even UES-FMP administrators change frequently, and research priorities and budgets
can quickly shift away from the current DRR advancements. Incorporating participants
from a variety of institutions should ensure continuity and sustainability of ongoing
efforts during periods of personnel turnover.
Similarly, integrating a variety of actors promotes continued involvement and
support from their respective institutions. Diversity within the research and development
groups allows institutions to share the burdens necessary to sustain efforts. Data
collection, equipment maintenance, and continued research requires both human and
financial investment. At San Vicente, these costs remain manageable as a host of
institutions share responsibility for the costs related to transportation, technicians’ time in
the field, and upkeep of equipment.
Finally, though advancements in monitoring, data collection, and training in San
Vicente have been achieved, there remain challenges to sustaining these efforts. Through
the PIRE and PEER programs there were ample opportunities for face-to-face interaction
between Michigan Tech and Salvadoran counterparts. Even though the PEER project
helped equip a virtual learning classroom, online training sessions are sparse, and
communication between institutions has lessened. Without site-specific field excursions
planned for the near future, there is a risk that more time-dependent priorities take the
place of project follow-up communication. Addressing this challenge requires improved
planning by both academic institutions and a dedication to semi-frequent communication
in order to continue to make research progress.
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Chapter 3: Disaster risk reduction and resettlement efforts at
San Vicente (Chichontepec) Volcano, El Salvador: toward
understanding social and geophysical vulnerability
Abstract

Despite a long history of volcanic debris flows on the northern flank of San
Vicente Volcano, El Salvador, authorities and communities were ill-prepared for the
lahars that occurred on Nov. 7-8, 2009. More than 250 people were killed by lahars
resulting from shallow landslides, not to mention millions of dollars (US) in damage to
houses, agriculture, and infrastructure. After the disaster, significant aid was invested in
the region to reduce risk to future disasters. This case study uses the ethnographic tools of
qualitative interviews, participant observation, and review of institutional documents to
analyze two particular aspects of disaster risk reduction strategies in the town of Verapaz:
1) relocation of at-risk residents led by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development,
and 2) hazard monitoring and emergency management training programs led by Civil
Protection, the University of El Salvador, and NGOs. The relocation effort, while
effective at reducing physical vulnerability to debris flows, failed to incorporate
livelihood, social networks, and cultural ties to homes in their project design and
implementation. Since diverse livelihoods are keys to survival, and tightly-knit social
networks help families share responsibilities and withstand shocks during hardships,
many families returned to the high-risk area or opted not to relocate. Others have adapted
using unanticipated strategies to benefit from the resettlement effort. On the other hand,
the emergency management training and education programs valued local input,
knowledge, and action, which has helped increase awareness and improved the overall
capacity to manage emergencies through wide, local participation. The different
approaches used in the two risk reduction initiatives reveal important lessons regarding
the importance of community participation and creating accountable partners. Challenges
derive from narrow understandings of vulnerability on the part of disaster risk reduction
experts, who neglected to consider and understand kin networks and residence patterns
that help maintain diverse livelihoods, as well as ensure safety and security. As
demonstrated in the 2011 Tropical Depression 12E, effective public engagement and
empowerment helped bridge the knowledge, awareness, and preparedness gaps that
existed prior to the 2009 disaster.

Based on: Bowman, L. and Henquinet, K.B. (2015). Disaster risk reduction and resettlement at San
Vicente volcano, El Salvador: toward understanding social and geophysical vulnerability. Journal of
Applied Volcanology; for the Special Issue, The Application of Volcanology Research to Emergency
Management.
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3.1 Introduction
Strategies for disaster risk reduction (DRR) in the aftermath of hazard events have
evolved over the last decade. The “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005 – 2015”
sponsored by United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)
emphasized sustainable development and disaster prevention rather than reactionary
responses (i.e., search and rescue and provisional sheltering) to catastrophic events
(United Nations 2007). Many countries, including El Salvador, are adapting their risk
reduction strategies around a plan of prevention; however, when disasters do occur,
especially in developing countries, governmental and non-governmental relief and
development institutions continue to consider relocation policies as viable, go-to
strategies to remove people from geographically hazardous areas. These strategies
narrowly focus on natural hazard vulnerability, while giving little thought to other types
of vulnerability. The case of the response to the 2009 San Vicente, El Salvador disaster
illustrates this point, while also showing ways in which natural hazard monitoring and
communication improvements have been made.
In November 2009, heavy rains at San Vicente volcano in Central El Salvador
(Figure 3.1) triggered shallow landslides that formed lahars. The debris flows affected
several communities on the northern flank of the volcano, including Verapaz, triggering a
massive relief and recovery effort. Nationally, disaster losses totaled approximately $240
million (USD), which represents more than 1.1% of GDP (United Nations 2010). Within
the housing sector alone, more than 20,000 homes were either destroyed, badly damaged,
or declared to be at-risk (United Nations 2010). Five months after the event, a $3.8
million (US) plan to relocate the most at-risk neighborhoods in Verapaz was underway
(Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de El Salvador 2012). This research examines the
ways in which at-risk populations in the small town of Verapaz were involved in
mitigation programs and assesses the outcomes of these programs. Results demonstrate
that despite best efforts, a significant gap persists between the authorities’ perception of
program success and the experience of the at-risk population near San Vicente. In
particular, we examine this gap in the implementation of the resettlement project, and we
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contrast this with more successful DRR initiatives that involved local residents in hazard
monitoring strategies and communication. The 2009 debris flow disaster resulted in
traumatic experiences for rural Salvadorans and underscored the challenges in
implementing effective risk reduction when livelihoods and social support networks are
disrupted.

Figure 3.1 Location of El Salvador and principal volcanoes (including San Vicente
Volcano). Reprinted with permission from Major et al. (2004).
Despite these shortcomings, new and sometimes unplanned livelihood and
disaster preparedness strategies slowly emerged as families adapted to new settlement
patterns after 2009. A long history of repression and the imposition of unfavorable
settlement policies have stifled poor Salvadorans’ social mobility, but also fostered
creative ways in the disaster’s aftermath for some to benefit from post-event relocation.
Affected residents largely fall into four distinct groups: 1) those who lost everything and
relocated to New Verapaz; 2) those who attempted relocating but returned to their
original homes; 3) those who used the relocation project to claim an additional home to
expand livelihood activities, and; 4) those who remain in risky areas of Verapaz and have
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no intention of relocating to New Verapaz. The relocation effort had mixed results; some
thrived while others struggled in the new settlement and opted to return to their old
homes.
We first situate this study within the existing literature on relocation programs and
place Salvadorans’ vulnerability within the context of the country’s colonial and political
history. We next describe ethnographic methods and data analysis techniques employed
throughout this study. In the results and discussion, we analyze the outcomes of uneven
integration of the concerns and values of at-risk populations into the resettlement project
planning and disaster risk monitoring efforts. In both cases, DRR experts focus on
reducing vulnerability to natural hazards rather than incorporating a broader
understanding of risk and vulnerability in people’s lives in Verapaz. The natural hazard
reduction focus was more effective in programs that incorporated communities in
ongoing hazard monitoring and communication than in the case of resettlement. This case
study illustrates a resettlement program that failed to view the process holistically and
incorporate affected residents’ concerns. It also highlights the advantages of engaging
stakeholders in the scientific and decision-making/risk communication process. We found
that resettlement was a more complex issue to plan for and successfully implement than
improving communication and promoting local monitoring of natural hazards.

3.2 Background
3.2.1 Relocation of At-risk Communities and Disasters
Relocation is a complex issue, often resulting in hardships to those affected and in
unanticipated outcomes. There is an extensive body of literature describing the challenges
and pitfalls of post-disaster relocation projects (Johnson 2007; Oliver-Smith 2009;
Cernea 1999; De Wet 2009). Whiteford and Tobin (2004) provide a comprehensive
review of cases showing that, “even though the literature on natural hazards and disasters
provides ample evidence to suggest that there are significant political, economic, social
and physical consequences to resettlement policies… resettlement remains a ‘popular
solution to hazard and disaster management’ (Chan 1995: 22)” (p. 190). Oliver-Smith
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(1991) reviews cases in Turkey, Iran, Peru, and Guatemala to pinpoint specific aspects of
each effort that contributed to either successful and unsuccessful results--one of the most
important being public engagement and beneficiary participation in project design and
implementation. Macías and Aguirre’s (2006) analysis of relocation efforts at Colima
volcano in Mexico points towards similar conclusions. Lack of community participation
and a top-down, government-mandated approach led to major social conflict. Reluctance
to move was also attributed to small home size, poor ventilation, inadequate construction
materials, close proximity to other homes, and a general poor design—all aspects that
“violate the customs of the people affected by disasters” (Macías and Aguirre 2006).
Usamah and Haynes (2011) similarly conclude that relocation efforts at Mayon volcano
in the Philippines did not consider broader livelihood concerns, meaningful beneficiary
participation, disruption of social networks, nor culturally appropriate housing design. It
therefore did not achieve institutions’ nor residents’ desired goals.
A well-studied, Latin American case occurred at Tungurahua Volcano near the
town of Baños, Ecuador where evacuation and relocation experiences resulted in varying
perceptions of success. The volcanic activity and subsequent emergency management
crisis made residents, authorities, and aid institutions acutely aware of each entity’s
opposing attitudes regarding evacuation and relocation (Lane et al., 2004). Relocation
was the preferred institutional response and, according to the institutions’ own analyses,
was successful; however some residents have very different, opposing sentiments (Tobin
and Whiteford, 2002). It may seem intuitive to suggest that relocation is the most
effective strategy to completely reduce a population’s susceptibility to volcanic
hazards—a disaster can only occur when society and a hazard overlap in space and time.
While efficient at reducing physical exposure to most hazards, relocation efforts that fail
to consider factors influencing social vulnerability can result in “serious, and often
permanent, socioeconomic and cultural suffering and impoverishment” for the resettled
population (De Wet 2009: 78). Whiteford and Tobin discuss how in the Tungurahua
Volcano case “emergency evacuation and resettlement policies unfairly hurt the most
vulnerable populations, the poor and the disenfranchised. Such policies are unhealthy
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because they make it more difficult for families to recover economic losses [and] separate
them from their kin and support networks” (2004: 189).
The challenges of livelihood disruption faced in Baños are similar to those
encountered by residents of Verapaz, El Salvador. Verapaz is a town of roughly 4,000
residents at the base of San Vicente volcano in an area of steep drainages prone to debris
flows and flooding. In both cases, residents were reluctant to leave their homes. In
Verapaz, the reasons for mixed relocation success stem from residents’ reluctance to
abandon their supportive social networks and livelihoods, among other relevant concerns
detailed below. Increased social and livelihood challenges in the resettlement dissuaded
residents living in high-risk areas from moving to new, free housing. For many residents
who did move, social vulnerability increased as families were cut off from support. As
Oliver-Smith (2009) notes, resettlement initiatives designed to avoid disasters can and
often do result in unintended “development disasters.”
In contrast to top-down implementation of the resettlement by the El Salvador
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, other DRR efforts led by Civil Protection,
the Universidad de El Salvador, and various NGOs included broad public engagement in
hazard monitoring and risk communication. Public participation in community-based risk
reduction can empower stakeholders by forming partnerships with NGOs, universities,
and other agencies, which can “improve the community understanding and stimulate the
willingness to build the culture for disaster prevention and preparedness (Karnawati et al.
2011: 153). Successful community-based early warning systems (CBEWS) are welldocumented: Indonesia (Fathani et al. 2014; Karnawati et al. 2011), Philippines (Allen
2006), Italy (García and Fearnley 2012), and Colombia (Coll 2013). The close
collaboration of DRR institutions in San Vicente allowed for strategic, well-funded
education and training opportunities for local residents to form a CBEWS. These systems
focused on communication during emergencies and empowered local observers to gather
information and transfer knowledge around San Vicente volcano. Unlike the relocation
cases discussed above, the CBEWS programs do not significantly disrupt people’s social
and economic lives.
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3.2.2 Geophysical Vulnerability in El Salvador
El Salvador is located in Central America above a subduction zone at the juncture
of the Cocos and Caribbean Plates (Figure 3.1). The tropical climate, along with its
geographic location, makes it at risk for a variety of geological and hydrometeorological
hazards, including: earthquakes (e.g., 1986, 2001), volcanic eruptions (e.g., 2005, 2013),
floods (e.g., 2009, 2011), landslides (e.g., 2005, 2009), debris flows/lahars (e.g., 2005,
2009), tropical storms/hurricanes (e.g., 1998, 2005, 2009), droughts (e.g., 2001, 2012),
and tsunamis (e.g., 1902, 1957). El Salvador is frequently ranked in the top ten countries
most susceptible to natural hazards by the United Nations and often ranks in the top three
(CEPAL 2010). Ninety-five percent of the Salvadoran population are at-risk of some
hazard, according to a 2010 report by the United Nations, and the World Bank ranks the
Salvadoran population as the second most exposed to “relatively high mortality risk from
multiple hazards” (UNDAC 2010; Government of El Salvador 2009; Dilley 2005; World
Bank 2006).
El Salvador’s precarious geographic location presents many hazards, but other
countries exposed to similar hazards (e.g. Chile, Colombia) do not experience
comparable disaster losses (De Greiff and Shashank 2012). Frequent experience with
costly disasters has not necessarily translated into improved hazard mitigation in El
Salvador, nor have DRR institutions succeeded in adequately preparing populations to
face hazards and their consequences (Wisner 2001; Bowman and White 2012).

3.2.3 Social Vulnerability in San Vicente
El Salvador’s colonial and political history shapes the rural poor’s extreme
situation of social and geophysical vulnerability. El Salvador was a Spanish colony from
the early 1500s to the early 1800s, and criollo elites ruled large estates, establishing
dominance over indigenous populations. El Salvador’s economy has been predominantly
based on agriculture. The early colonial sistema de encomienda (system of entrustment)
was the Spanish crown’s method to establish and maintain the Spanish criollo and
mestizo elites’ dominance in all facets of Salvadoran life and inhibit the indigenous
population’s upward mobility (Boland 2001: 16). Encomiendas allowed control over
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large tracts of arable land that left the indigenous populations with one option— forced
labor for the elite. The encomienda system “quickly degenerated into slavery” (Boland
2001: 16).
After independence from Spain in 1821, elite landowners occupied the fertile
lowlands in order to maximize production of indigo. Processes of elite land tenure further
marginalized indigenous populations by pushing them to less-desirable and more hazard
prone areas like steep ravines and stream banks (Wisner 2001: 254). In the mid-19th
Century, indigo was replaced by artificial dyes and demand for coffee rose (Williams
1994: 71). Finally, in 1881, any communal and State land that remained for use by rural
Salvadorans was expropriated to elite families. The national government determined that
the communal land system “impedes agricultural development, obstructs circulation of
wealth, and weakens family bonds and the independence of the individual;” therefore,
peasant farmers were instructed to forfeit their private land titles at which point they
could be sold at “public auction to the highest bidder” (Williams 1994: 74). Fertile
volcanic slopes were quickly repossessed from indigenous communities for coffee
production, which once again dispossessed the Salvadoran poor from their lands. During
this period, Haggarty describes that policy-makers:
generally agreed on the promotion of coffee as the predominant cash crop, on the
development of infrastructure (railroads and port facilities) primarily in support of
the coffee trade, on the elimination of communal landholdings to facilitate further
coffee production, on the passage of antivagrancy laws to ensure that displaced
campesinos and other rural residents provided sufficient labor for the coffee
fincas (plantations), and on the suppression of rural discontent (Haggarty 1988:
1).
The resultant social structure further concentrated wealth and power and ensured that
access to education, land ownership, social works, and healthcare were kept out of reach
of the oppressed majority (Haggarty 1988: 1). (Wisner 2001: 252–253) describes that
“the poor majority have been scratching out a living on tiny plots while selling their labor
to the coffee barons” or forced to migrate ever since the 1881 expropriation of land.
Inaccessibility to land, extreme economic inequality, and a political system
favoring the wealthy led to uprisings, rebellions, massacres, and most recently a 12-yearlong civil conflict (1980–1992) which killed 75,000 people (Wisner 2001; Wood 2003:
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23, 56). At the start of the war in 1980, “90% of all farms were less than five hectares,
and six families held more property than the 133,000 smallest-scale farmers” (FUSADES
and The World Bank 1998: 194). Though some land tenure reforms were established
throughout the war to appease combatants, meaningful advancements were not achieved
until the 1992 Peace Accords. Even these reforms were plagued by “delays in
implementation, disgruntlement concerning the quality of land to be transferred, high
land prices, and not surprisingly, political tension” (FUSADES and The World Bank:
197). This political and socioeconomic reality perpetuates Salvadorans’ physical and
social vulnerability to natural hazards and limits their overall resilience when facing
hazard events.
Around San Vicente, the fertile volcanic soil, centralized location, and proximity
to the Lempa River make this area an agricultural hub. For these reasons, much of the
territory has been managed and/or owned by the wealthy elite since colonization.
Presently, the higher elevation is dominated by coffee crops, while the fertile bottomlands
are used for sugarcane production. Hence, the poorest residents in Verapaz have settled
on the high-risk banks of the Quebradona Creek. Many Vicentinos (people from San
Vicente) comment that, “El volcán es de Cristiani”—referring to the fact that nearly the
entire volcano is owned by former president Alfredo Felix Cristiani Burkard serving his
coffee production enterprise.
3.2.3.1 Community and Livelihoods in Verapaz
In order to understand why the communication, education, and monitoring
strategies implemented in Verapaz succeeded while the resettlement did not achieve
anticipated outcomes of planners, the reader needs some socio-cultural background on the
community fabric and livelihood strategies of the residents. The structures of community
support and livelihoods that exist in Verapaz are an adaptation to the circumstances of
geophysical and social vulnerability described above. These adaptations help explain how
these people can live in precarious circumstances.
In 2009, the ethnically homogeneous, mestizo population of Verapaz municipality
was 6,257, the majority of whom live in and around the town center and government seat
59

in Verapaz (Fundación Intervida 2012). The town is connected to the departmental
capital city (San Vicente) by a paved highway on which public transportation runs
regularly. There is a municipal government, public health clinic, school center, civil
court, National Civilian Police office, and Cultural House that all form the base of
institutional support and helped provide services after the 2009 disaster. No formal
community organizations are registered with the municipal government in Verapaz;
therefore groups that have formed cannot benefit directly from governmental financial
support. Similarly, there are no organized governmental or institutional efforts to help
diversify livelihoods, strengthen entrepreneurship, or support economic growth or local
production of goods. There are four economic-oriented community groups that support
sugarcane production, basic grain production, egg production, and women’s sewing
projects; however no group has an annual budget or outside support (Fundación Intervida
2012).
Livelihoods in the town of Verapaz largely revolve around agricultural activities
dominated by a male workforce. Families often rely on women, however, to help
diversify livelihoods and income generating activities on top of their unpaid labor in the
home. In addition to ensuring a smoothly run family unit, women are largely responsible
for small-scale animal husbandry, operating corner stores, producing and selling dairy
and sugar-cane-based products, and making and selling corn tortillas. One hundred and
fifteen families maintained cows and small-scale dairy production operations, and 85% of
families possessed one to three animals. Household production of chickens, eggs, pigs,
and goats is commonplace and culturally valued by the women who manage these
activities. Downtown Verapaz is peppered with small mini-mart stores, hardware and
agricultural supply businesses, seamstresses, shoe repair shops, and a couple of
household-run pupuserias (restaurants)—many of which are overseen by women.
Importantly, some families are supported through the more recent influence of remesas—
financial support sent from (mostly male) family members that live and work in the
United States and other countries. In Verapaz, an estimated 10% of families receive
monies sent from the U.S. to help with daily living expenses, which are often managed by
women (Fundación Intervida 2012).
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The vast majority of wage earners are employed as day-laborers by larger
landowners, and they are considered poor working class (Cabrera and Amaya 2015;
Fundación Intervida 2012; San Vicente Productivo 2001). Of the 18 departments in El
Salvador, San Vicente Department has the highest concentration of individuals living in
extreme poverty (Cabrera and Amaya 2015). In Verapaz, larger land holdings ranged
from 11.5 acres (14 hectares) up to hundreds of acres and are concentrated among just 19
households who use them commercially for coffee and sugarcane production or rent plots
to local residents (Fundación Intervida 2012). Individual farmers who are not wage
laborers rent plots of land from large landowners to plant corn, beans, maize and other
vegetables. Many of these small-scale farmers are forced to pursue unfavorable credit
options from powerful lending institutions or individuals to pay for access to land, seed,
fertilizer, and pesticides (Fundación Intervida 2012). Some are also able to claim small
plots of land close to steep drainages to cultivate for market and subsistence needs. More
than half of the 934 total farmers in Verapaz cultivate less than 1.16 acres (1.4 hectares)
of land for their households’ use (Fundación Intervida 2012). One resident day-laborer
describes typical farm life in Verapaz:
Here we pretty much all do the same…most of us work as campesinos, daylaborers. Maybe a mother had a son in the United States who sent money, but
most of us struggle and work in the [coffee] fincas. Or in the cane fields. Cleaning
and fertilizing coffee. All of the big fincas are there. He who doesn’t like to go to
the fincas goes to cut sugar cane or work in the sugar mills. We have to work,
even though it doesn’t pay well, for food… Here we kill ourselves working. But
the profit is for the “Big Guy”—the one who controls the monopoly. – Interview 1
(Male, mid-30s)
This current reality of land availability and ownership are indicative of the
historical colonial influence that still plays a major role in livelihood realities for rural
farmers. To this day, Salvadorans frequently refer to the influence of “The 14
Families”—an influential group of elite families believed to dominate social structure and
politics throughout El Salvador for generations (Haggarty 1988). As of 2009, the poorest
20% of Salvadorans earned only 3.71% of total income shared in the country (ranking
116th in income inequality out of 156 countries) (IndexMundi 2014).
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The towns of Verapaz, Guadalupe and Tepetitan are currently situated near
drainages or directly on top of past debris flow deposits. Citing the inherent danger of
living in close proximity to natural drainages, Civil Protection and the National Assembly
passed a law in 2003 prohibiting construction and development of land in close proximity
(50 meters) to active (or potentially active) drainages (Viceministerio de Vivienda y
Desarrollo Urbano de El Salvador 2003). This land is legally “protected” and off limits
for ownership and development. However, in San Vicente department this law was not
enforced. For poor, landless Salvadorans, squatting in these precarious locations for
living and farming practices became their only viable option, which increased exposure
to lahar and flood hazards.
This history of unstable land tenure is so deeply entrenched that it continues to be
accepted—or at least expected—by Salvadorans. Ties to land and agricultural practices
run deep—not because rural farmers pass down large parcels of land from one generation
to the next, but because families carry on livelihood practices that have sustained them
for centuries. In this largely subsistence and wage-laborer-based agricultural tradition in
Verapaz, families, neighbors, and friends are often supportive of one another to help meet
basic needs.
Vicentinos have developed diverse livelihood and social networks in the face of
systemic marginalization and oppression. These coping strategies benefit tight-knit
communities throughout daily life and in times of hardships, war, and disasters. Most
importantly, these networks persist today. Residents describe the importance of their
family and neighbors during hazard events, and also exhibit their own collective agency
to make decisions contrary to institutional plans or directives.
Residents largely describe a supportive, extended family-based structure that
provides necessary assistance during times of need and enforces safety and security
within the community. Many families are multi-generational and occupy the same
residences. These assistance networks were crucial, as survivors reflected on the reliance
of family and trusted neighbors that provided rescue, aid, lodging, and basic goods during
and after the crisis. The tightly-knit social fabric defining community resilience in
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Verapaz is fundamental for weathering adversities born by social and economic
inequality, as well as those provoked by hydrometeorological events.

3.3 Methods
This study is based on experiences of residents affected by the 2009 lahar disaster
but incorporates analysis of institutional interventions realized in the region during the
months and years after the event. Understanding social dynamics (historical,
organizational, political, and cultural) and clearly identifying which strategies are
currently being used by institutions in El Salvador to reduce disaster risk were key
components to the study. Field observations, review of literature and primary documents,
and in-depth, qualitative interviews of targeted populations regarding the disaster and
crisis management experience were collected in San Vicente and Verapaz during a 15month-long field season (April 2011 – June 2012) for this ethnographic research project.
A total of 38 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with four,
unique target groups:
● Uninhabitable Zone Residents (12 Interviews)
-

Most houses in this area were completely destroyed by the lahar, but
13 homes (though heavily damaged) remain standing and are
occupied, even though the Ministry of Housing declared this area
legally “uninhabitable.” One family living in this zone opted not to
participate.

● High Risk Road Residents (7 Interviews)
-

This is one of several areas located in southern Verapaz deemed “high
risk” but is unique as some houses were completely destroyed or
heavily damaged in 2009. Though the area was heavily affected it was
never formally declared “uninhabitable.” Eight homes remain and are
occupied. One family living in this zone opted not to participate.

● Relocated Residents (8 Interviews)
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-

These interviews took place in the new settlement, New Verapaz. Four
were conducted with residents in permanent homes, and four in
temporary homes awaiting permanent homes.

● Disaster Risk Reduction Institution Representatives (11 Interviews)
-

These interviews were conducted with representatives from
institutions (governmental, non-governmental, academic) working on
disaster risk reduction initiatives in the region.

New Verapaz was designed to meet housing needs for 244 affected (or potentially
affected) families that lie within the 50 meter boundary of an active (or potentially active)
drainage. Most of these families did not experience a direct impact from the 2009
disaster, but the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development sought to avoid future
disaster impacts for these at-risk areas. Hence, several other less-affected neighborhoods
downstream the Quebradona Creek were deemed “high risk,” and these families were
offered a new home and encouraged to move. The sample for this study focuses on nearly
all of the families within the “uninhabitable” and “high-risk” zones of Verapaz that were
devastated in 2009, as these families would seemingly have the most interest in moving
to a new settlement. All of these families have either stayed in their original (often
damaged) homes or relocated to New Verapaz but decided to move back to their old
“high risk” homes.
The interview guide was developed by both authors and a professor at the
Universidad de El Salvador, then further modified as relevant themes emerged
throughout interviews. The structure of the interview guide was open-ended so as to
minimize researcher bias and to allow for a relaxed conversation that could expand and
contract based on the interviewee’s comfort with the topic (Morgan et al. 1992; Kempton
1996). The goal of these interviews was to better understand residents’ ties to their land,
reasons for leaving or not leaving their homes during and after the disaster, reasons for
accepting or not accepting homes in the resettlement neighborhood, and experiences (past
and current) in working with relief and development institutions that arrived to the region
after the 2009 disaster.
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All interviews were conducted in Spanish (occasionally alongside a Salvadoran
field assistant) and digitally recorded. I (first author) or a Spanish-speaking assistant then
transcribed each audio file verbatim. Each transcribed interview was subsequently coded
using Atlas.ti software in order to more effectively “search for patterns in data and for
ideas that help explain why those patterns are there in the first place” (Bernard 2013
taken from Saldana 2009: 8). A combination of descriptive and values coding was used in
order to both “document and categorize” a wide range of varying experiences and
opinions from the interviewees but also to “capture and label subjective perspectives”
from each participant from the highly variable backgrounds of the aforementioned target
groups (Saldana 2009: 6–7). Codes were established for each of the transcribed
interviews, based on researcher and informant categories. For example, the broader
categories of “Relocation” and “Livelihoods” contain many subcategories and codes
(Table 3.1). And these subcategories were further broken down to identify patterns and
differences between informants on these topics.
Table 3.1 Example categories, subcategories and codes for data analysis
Category: Livelihoods
Category: Relocation
Subcategory 1: Agriculture
Subcategory 1: Chose to Relocate
Code: Land Owner
Code: Relocation Challenges
Code: Land Renter
Code: Relocation Reasoning
Code: Day-laborer
Code: Relocation Rights
Code: Sugar-cane
Code: Relocation Benefits
Code: Coffee
Code: Relocation and Livelihoods
Code: Vegetables (Corn, beans, other)
Code: Relocation and Kinship
Code: Wages, Loans, Taxes
Networks
Code: Affected by 2009 Disaster
Subcategory 2: Chose not to Relocate
Subcategory 2: Small Business
Code: Challenges to Old Verapaz
Code: Resources Available
Code: Reasoning
Code: Credit/Loans
Code: Lahar Hazard Awareness
Code: Affected by 2009 Disaster
Code: Legal Ramifications
Code: Impacts Post-Ida
Code: Livelihoods in Old Verapaz
Code: Relocated
Code: Kinship Networks in Old
Code: Not Relocated
Verapaz
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I (first author) translated each quote used throughout this paper. Field notes taken
during each interaction with interviewees were used to complement audio file data.
Similarly, I attended a variety of community events, institution-sponsored risk reduction
projects, planning meetings, UES-FMP-sponsored DRR courses and workshops, crisis
simulations, and an actual emergency (Tropical Depression 12 E, Oct. 2011), which
permitted rich opportunities to employ the ethnographic tool of participant observation
and acquire key documents on DRR programs. Field notes and key documents were also
coded for themes and integrated with the categories determined from the interview data.
Participant observations were used to triangulate the different data sets.
Interview sampling methods varied between the three target groups. Nearly all of
the residents of the uninhabitable zone (12 interviews) and high-risk road (7 interviews)
who refused to move to Nuevo Verapaz were interviewed. In Nuevo Verapaz, the sample
was initially purposive, as it was important to capture perspectives from residents who
had moved into their permanent homes (4 interviews) as well as from residents who were
still in temporary, pre-fabricated homes (4 interviews) awaiting completion of their
permanent home (Bernard 2013: p. 164 – 167). Key informants (11 interviews) from
institutions doing DRR work were chosen based on the first author’s interaction and
rapport with them over the course of the field work, the informant’s expertise and interest
in the study, and their involvement with different risk reduction interventions in the
region. Participants in this group include faculty from La Universidad de El Salvador –
Facultad Multidisciplinaria Paracentral, the coordinator and technicians from Civil
Protection (municipal, departmental, and regional levels), National Civilian Police, the
coordinator and technicians from The Center for Disaster Protection (CEPRODE), and
United Nations volunteers.

3.4. Results and Discussion
In response to the 2009 disaster in Verapaz, hazard monitoring strategies
improved and a new settlement was built for relocating people living in at-risk zones. The
analysis detailed below explains the state of hazard monitoring before and after the 2009
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disaster; in brief, communication of hazards improved between DRR experts and local
residents, which was demonstrated in a subsequent 2011 emergency. The resettlement
project, which aimed to permanently remove residents from at-risk zones and provide
them with new homes in New Verapaz, did not meet its goals entirely. Instead the at-risk
zones remained fully inhabited, even as New Verapaz filled up with occupants. These
unanticipated outcomes reflect the lack of consideration for local livelihoods, social
networks, and connections to home when planning the resettlement project. Because the
impact of relocation on these aspects of life in Verapaz was not explicitly considered,
some families founds their social vulnerability was increased in some ways, while others
were able to take advantage of new resources to come up with their own hazard
mitigation and improved socioeconomic strategies. Both the hazard monitoring and
relocation projects focused primarily on geophysical vulnerability—getting people out of
the path of the lahars. This understanding of vulnerability lent itself well to increased
local participation in monitoring and planning for future lahars or other hazards;
however, this was not so straight forward in the case of the resettlement project, which
also required serious consideration of factors contributing to social vulnerability.

3.4.1 Disaster knowledge of authorities and at-risk populations: Before
and after 2009
Salvadorans’ extreme vulnerability to natural hazards is well-known among
practitioners and authorities, but hazard knowledge is not disseminated to at-risk
populations or even local authorities tasked with disaster preparedness and response. On
the other hand, evidence also shows that residents did not communicate past experiences
with disasters to practitioners and institutions before the 2009 lahar disaster. A complete
lack of preparedness, little awareness, and no institutionalized measures for early warning
or evacuation contributed to the human and material losses during the disaster. However,
improvements in disaster knowledge and communication started to be implemented after
the 2009 disaster; the success of these changes was demonstrated by the community
response during Tropical Depression 12E in October 2011.
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A prime example of hazard knowledge that was never shared with the at-risk
population is the case of a comprehensive, country-wide volcanic hazard assessment
conducted in 2004. This effort by SNET and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
produced a hazard map for San Vicente volcano that defined possible inundations zones
and high, medium, and low risk areas for lahars of hypothetical volumes (Major 2004).
This work was published (albeit, in English) and made freely available online. For
reasons not fully understood, this hazard map was never disseminated to the residents or
authorities in any of the five municipalities on the northern flank of San Vicente volcano.
There was no enforcement of the 2003 law prohibiting construction within 50 meters of
drainages, and no other restrictions were applied in Verapaz concerning where people
could build homes, regardless of the fact that past lahars had destroyed parts of the town
and that the new map indicated that populated areas were at high risk for debris flows. In
fact, according to residents, most were completely unaware that any hazard analysis had
ever been conducted in the region.
[The town] disappeared, because they had never done a study. They had never
done a study to see if the zone was habitable, but people needed homes, and they
risked living so close to a drainage. Practically at the shore of the creek, the
neighborhood was constructed...[even though] there were previous events. –
Interview 3
Similarly, the vast majority of respondents allude to their lack of awareness of the lahar
hazard in Verapaz, and certainly no one was in any way prepared for the event that
unfolded.
We never took it seriously, that it was possible that there could be such
destruction…since no one ever told us that this had happened in the past, we
didn’t know… – Interview 2
Though SNET was aware of lahar hazards in the region, information was not
disseminated to municipal and departmental government institutions, including Civil
Protection, as they were caught completely off-guard by the lack of warning and
magnitude of the event in 2009.
The event took the government by surprise…afterwards, the government changed
[its approach]. – Civil Protection representative
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It is important to reiterate that the three municipalities near San Vicente
considered at high risk for volcanic debris flows (Verapaz, Guadalupe, and Tepetitán)
have all experienced these hazards first-hand over the last 100 years. The January and
February 2001 earthquakes leveled much of Guadalupe and Verapaz, and in August of
the same year a debris flow killed one person and damaged infrastructure. In 1913 and
1934, debris-flow events destroyed a large portion of Tepetitán, for which it is now called
Antiguo Tepetitán (Old Tepetitán). This area was abandoned, and survivors resettled at
(New) Tepetitán, located a couple hundred meters away from the ruins of Antiguo
Tepetitán. Likewise, deposits from this event covered southern Verapaz, destroying
homes along the Quebradona Creek and killing many individuals. Memories of this event
were, in some cases, orally passed to younger generations. Experience with recurring
disasters, however, does not necessarily translate into increased awareness or adoption of
preparedness measures.
Grandfather told us when he was just a few months old, the first one
occurred…the first one occurred in 1913—in 1913 it happened. Later, the second
one occurred around 1934. In ’34, this town didn’t suffer as much as in 1913.
Actually, 1913 was very devastating…practically the same zone that was
destroyed in 1913 is where it happened again in 2009. – Interview 3
As the memory of the 1934 disaster faded, Verapaz’s expansion slowly
encroached to encompass the exact area destroyed in 1934. Some structures, including a
new hospital/clinic and many houses, were actually built around large boulders deposited
by the 1934 flow because they were too large to move. Entire neighborhoods were
constructed on top of lahar deposits, even though elderly residents recall advising
builders not to invade the areas closest to the drainage where the disaster occurred in
1934. Some study participants remembered these stories and warnings from the older
generation, but only in hindsight after the disaster. Some also expressed their lack of
understanding that past events could repeat themselves.
They say—(aside) I don’t remember—that in 1934 the volcano washed out, and a
large part of Tepetitan was lost with a large part of San Vicente. There was
evidence that something had come down [the volcano]. That was in 1934…the
people, the new generations—no one believed that another situation would occur.
We have personally lived it, and know that it can. – Interview 10
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Notably, representatives from DRR institutions were not aware of residents’ past
accounts and oral histories. Indeed, most residents acknowledge that past disasters were
not openly discussed or considered prior to the 2009 event. This fact represents that there
has also been a communication disconnect of local hazard knowledge held by residents
that was not openly communicated to scientists and authorities, exposing a two-sided
hurdle in risk communication and risk reduction.

3.4.2 The 2009 Event and Official Response
The 2009 lahar disaster at San Vicente volcano made evident the risk
communication and risk reduction problems outlined above. In the end, the disaster
spurred the Government of El Salvador (GOES) to expand Civil Protection-led efforts
and hire dozens of technicians who were trained and strategically placed in the most atrisk communities. In San Vicente, Civil Protection was free to partner with local GO and
NGO institutions to strengthen their own capacity to engage local residents in education,
preparedness, and training efforts in order to incorporate them into hazard monitoring
activities. The GOS demonstrated its support to the victims through this expansion of
Civil Protection. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development also created a
relocation scheme after the 2009 disaster to reduce the risk of people living in
government-declared uninhabitable and high risk zones.
Between 11:00 pm – 3:00 am local time (UTC – 6 hours) on November 7–8,
2009, a low-pressure system related to Hurricane Ida caused intense rainfall (355 mm
over a period of five hours) that triggered shallow landslides and deadly debris flows on
the northern flank of San Vicente Volcano in Central El Salvador. Lahars inundated
neighborhoods of towns in five municipalities (Guadalupe, Verapaz, Tepetitán, San
Cayetano Istepeque, and San Vicente) killing more than 250 people and destroying
between 130 – 200 homes (Figure 4.2). Though five municipalities encompass the
northern flank of the volcano, the town and municipal center of Verapaz immediately
became the symbol of the tragedy due to the impressive images of the damage and the
tragic stories told by survivors (Figure 4.3).
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Figure 3.2 Five affected municipalities encompassing the northern flank of San Vicente
Volcano. Inset of Verapaz and New Verapaz, modified from Google Earth (2012).

Figure 3.3 Aftermath of lahar destruction in Verapaz (Photo Credit: Jose Fredy Cruz
Centeno).
Lack of warning and effective preparedness, and the timing and magnitude of the
event all exacerbated disaster losses. Rescue and recovery efforts in the immediate
aftermath of the disaster provided survivors with shelter, food, clothing, and healthcare.
National and international development and aid institutions quickly conducted needs
assessments to identify how to best provide for the affected areas and determine longer71

term strategies to reduce vulnerability to future disasters (CEPAL 2010; Duran 2010;
Government of El Salvador 2009).
Aid poured into the region to help with the short-term recovery effort, and plans for
the resettlement in New Verapaz (two kilometers northeast of Verapaz) and additional
DRR efforts followed (see inset Figure 2). Survivors reported positive experiences with the
generosity offered by volunteers and aid organizations that provided food, clothing, and
shelter. In the department of San Vicente, 130 – 200 homes were completely destroyed, so
four existing structures (two schools, one church, and one community center) were
converted into provisional shelters. Most families reported living in shelters from a few
weeks up to three months.
As response and aid distribution shifted from meeting basic needs to a longer-term
solution to reduce risk, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development declared that
homes located within 300 meters on either side of the Quebradona drainage were
“uninhabitable.” This decision immediately made 234 homes off-limits, and most of these
families represent the most vulnerable sector of the population that had encroached into
dangerous areas (Aguirre 2011). Many families resisted this policy decision—not only the
families affected in 2009 but also many who were not directly affected but fell within the
300 meter “uninhabitable” range. To mitigate backlash and provide a more permanent risk
reduction agenda, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development purchased a parcel of
land outside the high risk area for the construction of New Verapaz--a proposed settlement
of 244 homes for affected residents located two kilometers away from Verapaz (Aguirre
2011; Gobierno de El Salvador 2010). Money for the land purchase and settlement
construction was donated from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the
Panamanian Embassy, Oxfam, UNICEF, the Italian Episcopal Conference, and the
municipal government of Verapaz, and costs exceeded 5.4 million (USD). Governmentissued announcements describe the overall goal of the resettlement project to “provide
housing and new habitat for families” and meet “minimum basic conditions” for “humble,
affected families” but mention nothing regarding community participation, livelihood
considerations, or preservation of social networks (Ministerio de Vivienda y Desarrollo
Urbano 2013a; Ministerio de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano 2013b).
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In May 2010 (six months after the disaster), 60 families who had not made their
own housing arrangement (temporary or permanent) or had not reoccupied their damaged
homes were chosen randomly and given the opportunity to reside in temporary, prefabricated homes constructed at the site for New Verapaz (Figure 3.4). These 60
temporary homes fell far short of the 244 permanent homes the government promised
(Aguirre 2011). Slowly, however, the temporary settlement evolved into the permanent
solution designed by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. Eventually,
families that completely lost their homes during the disaster or lived in homes within the
confines of the newly designated “uninhabitable” area were offered a new, permanent
home in New Verapaz. Groups of homes were constructed in phases, and this process
took years. When a house was finished, a lottery was held to determine which family in
the list of beneficiaries would receive the house. The vice-minister of Housing and Urban
Development, Jose Roberto Gochez, celebrated commencing the final phase of
construction in October 2012 by announcing that “the initiative will benefit 244 families,
which in the coming months can count not only on adequate housing but a fully
developed habitat” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de El Salvador 2012). The last
batch of 123 permanent houses was not completed until March 2013, more than three
years after the event (Ministerio de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano 2013a).

Figure 3.4 Resettlement homes in New Verapaz (Photo Credit: Ministerio de Vivienda y
Desarrollo Urbano 2013a).
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Even the President of the Republic, Mauricio Funes, indicated that a change
needed to be made in order to avoid future disasters. Five months after the disaster, he
addressed the communities of Guadalupe and Verapaz to reassure them that the disaster
and the institutional shortcomings will not be repeated in the future.
We promise you, through government support, that new natural disasters will not
have the same tragic consequences of [Tropical] Storm Ida. I have assured you
personally…next time, institutions will not react the same, and we will not
improvise and risk the lives of entire communities by not giving priority to risk
prevention…– Mauricio Funes, President of El Salvador (Funes 2010)
For this reason, the 2009 disaster marks a “before and after” in terms of DRR in
El Salvador. It was immediately recognized that the emergency overwhelmed not only
the ill-prepared public but also institutional capacity. Lack of awareness, preparedness,
and a reliance on reactionary strategies were deemed unacceptable, leading to institutiondriven initiatives to reduce risk in the region. Strengthening Civil Protection’s capacity
and training, hiring new community-based technicians, and closer collaboration with
University of El Salvador investigations and NGO DRR initiatives were all
improvements from the previous system. The Center for Disaster Protection
(CEPRODE), the National Foundation for Development (FUNDE), the Municipalities for
the Jiboa Valley (MIJIBOA), Caritas San Vicente Diocese, and a United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) project all provided human and financial support to the
broadened DRR strategy. An alliance of GO and NGO efforts have been effective at
training local residents to monitor rainfall and calculate rainfall rates, better understand
precipitation as a landslide/lahar trigger, and use a two-way radio communication
network to report daily precipitation data and other observed changes (e.g., surface
cracks) directly to the municipal Civil Protection technicians and others in the monitoring
network. The results of these institutional efforts have improved hazard awareness and
disaster preparedness, as demonstrated below in the response to Tropical Depression 12E
in 2011.

3.4.3 Community-based early warning system effectiveness
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The participatory approaches used by Civil Protection, the University of El
Salvador, and a cadre of NGOs addressed the knowledge gap through inclusive training
and education programs--especially for individuals who opted not to resettle and
remained within the uninhabitable zone. These residents are now more vigilant to
monitor quickly changing conditions that might indicate a possible lahar. Local monitors
go upstream during heavy rains to check river levels and listen for landslides upslope or
approaching lahars—information that they spread to the other residents awaiting news in
their homes.
We are vigilant about checking on conditions, and we even go up to look at the
stream to see how much water there is. – Interview 20 with resident of
uninhabitable zone who claimed a house in New Verapaz and goes there during
heavy rains.
In Agua Agria and in San Emigdio my friends pass time on the computer and on
Facebook and they tell me when it’s raining. For whatever thing is happening,
they warn me. – Interview 20 with resident of uninhabitable zone who claimed a
house in New Verapaz and goes there during heavy rains.
Part of this new awareness comes out of having seen first-hand and survived the
destruction in 2009. But ongoing institutional efforts have strengthened Verapaz’s and
the surrounding communities’ organizational capacity to monitor environmental
conditions. Participant observation carried out by the first author during the training of
local observers and during field trips and scientific campaigns showed that community
participants are engaged in the scientific process. Observations of local observers’ actions
and attitudes during the management of a real crisis in 2011 and data gathered from the
semi-structured interviews all establish that the partnerships between NGOs, the
Universidad de El Salvador, and Civil Protection helped spark and maintain communitylevel interest in local monitoring initiatives. Rather than be passive recipients of
information generated by unknown entities, local observers are actively involved in
gathering data and making relevant observations while ensuring that the information is
communicated to the authorities and the public.
Local observers within the CBEWS measure rainfall rates and communicate
potentially dangerous conditions to local Civil Protection authorities via two-way radios.
Observers also use the radios to communicate information to one another and to the
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municipal hub in Verapaz. Information is then distributed via cell phones, SMS
messages, social media, and during emergencies the local Civil Protection technician will
communicate information and recommendations via megaphone throughout Verapaz.
Each municipality is equipped with a weather station, a communication hub, and a
Civil Protection technician/liaison; and key actors are trained in standard operating
procedures during emergencies. Residents are watchful and learn to recognize potential
precursors and signs that might provide warning to future hazard events, such as lahars,
landslides, and floods. Residents’ decisions to temporarily relocate and evacuate the high
risk zone during periods of heavy rain or during official Civil Protection warnings makes
effective use of new training, increased awareness, and a safer space provided in New
Verapaz. Institutional support has made these improvements a priority, and all of these
steps have been realized after the 2009 disaster.
Tropical Depression 12E in October 2011 was the first time the Centers for
Emergency Operations (COE) were activated. I (first author) was present during the
entire, 12-day-long crisis and used participant observation, field notes, post-emergency
reports, and targeted interviews with DRR representatives to analyze the effectiveness of
the new emergency management strategy. Though participants’ hypothetical roles and
responsibilities were taught during a five-month-long emergency management
certification course, Tropical Depression 12E occurred before trained individuals could
participate in a scheduled emergency simulation exercise. The first real-life application of
the training received occurred during the nearly two-week-long emergency presented by
Tropical Depression 12E. The first two days after Civil Protection elevated the hazard
alert level and activated the COE, Civil Protection and CEPRODE facilitated the
designation of actors’ management roles. Also, communication protocols were
established between local observers, authorities, and the public. Throughout the
following ten days of emergency management, the connection to the network of local
observers proved invaluable at reporting data in near real-time, which allowed decision
makers to evacuate at-risk residents in a timely manner. As active, trained participants in
risk reduction, local residents and DRR institutions are better connected and rely on one
another to correct some of the past communication and hazard awareness problems. The
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new COE program was able to successfully utilize the close social networks of the
Verapaz Community to communicate critical geophysical data, hazard warnings, and
evacuation recommendations.

3.4.4 Mixed Success in Relocation Efforts
Differing understandings of priorities between outside authorities and Verapaz
residents also played out in other medium and long-term assistance provided for disaster
mitigation and recovery, particularly the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development’s
relocation scheme that developed. Relocation planners aimed to permanently remove
residents from the uninhabitable and at-risk zones in Verapaz. This was not achieved,
although alternate housing was provided and occupied by some extended family
members from at-risk households, newcomers to the area, and some at-risk residents
downstream whose homes fell within the 50 meter “high-risk” delineation. The results
discussed in this section examine, from the viewpoint of families from the at-risk zone,
how the resettlement project unfolded, what advantages and disadvantages they saw
within the project, and how they came to decide where to reside. Based on their
responses, a disruption of livelihoods, social networks, and ties to home were among the
most common reasons why residents decided not to permanently relocate from their atrisk homes.
The relocation project design demonstrated a lack of awareness on the part of
project planners about day-to-day survival and social vulnerability in Verapaz.
Community “participation” in the project was limited to families’ obligatory labor during
construction of their new homes alongside the contractors hired by the Ministry of
Housing and Urban Development. Because of the limited incorporation of local concerns
and knowledge, the relocation project brought some unanticipated outcomes. Affected
residents largely fall into four distinct groups. Some residents were forced to move to
New Verapaz because there were no other viable housing options when their houses were
completely destroyed. Other residents initially relocated to New Verapaz but returned to
their original, at-risk homes in Verapaz. Another contingent used the relocation project to
their advantage by claiming a house in New Verapaz with the intent of remaining in
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Verapaz while renting the new house for additional income or gifting it to family
members in need. Finally, there is a group of residents who remained in Verapaz and has
no intention of relocating. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development struggled to
achieve desired objectives, because livelihoods, social networks, and strong ties to homes
were not adequately considered during project design and implementation.
Except for homes that were completely destroyed and swept away from their
foundations, nearly every other home left standing was cleaned out and reoccupied in the
days and weeks after the disaster. Houses that were buried up to their rooftops in mud,
boulders, and debris—houses where family members were killed—were patched up,
swept out, and made livable. For outsiders (foreigners or national
authorities/practitioners), it made little sense that residents would want to reoccupy their
former homes after having experienced the trauma of the 2009 debris flows. A seemingly
rational institutional response to the situation facilitated the hasty approval of the
permanent relocation program by government authorities at the Ministry of Housing and
Urban Development. Two actions were taken to facilitate this development project: 1)
southern Verapaz was declared uninhabitable, which legally prohibited residents’
reoccupation of homes, and 2) the construction of first temporary, then permanent homes
in a new settlement—New Verapaz—where affected families could relocate.
Project implementers in the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development deem
the initiative a success because each of the new homes is occupied. For the residents in
New Verapaz, as described below, physical exposure to the lahar hazard has certainly
diminished compared to living in high-risk or uninhabitable zones. However, occupation
of these new homes does not mean no one is living in the high-risk or uninhabitable
zones. Occupants of the new homes include not only relocated residents from Verapaz,
but also outsiders who were able to get included on the beneficiary list, family members
who have split off from multi-generational families residing in Verapaz, and residents
new to the area renting the new home from families that have moved back to or stayed in
Verapaz. In reality, the homes that were not totally destroyed in the uninhabitable zone
and high-risk focus area are still nearly completely occupied, as residents are reluctant to
relocate mainly due to disruption of livelihoods and unwillingness to abandon social
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networks. The relocation initiative systematically (yet unintentionally) exacerbates social
vulnerability for some households in both Old and New Verapaz, yet also opened some
select opportunities for particular families that claimed additional free houses, rented
newly claimed homes while continuing to reside in their old homes, or claimed a new
home even though they were not affected in 2009.
The 19 families interviewed who have reoccupied their old homes do not live
amongst the ruins of their old neighborhood in their original houses because they have no
other option. A new home in New Verapaz was made available to each of them. The
reasons behind their reluctance to move are rooted in social, cultural, and economic
realities that dissuade the population from abandoning a deeply ingrained and
advantageous system that offers strategies to cope with economic and social
vulnerability. Livelihood disruption, deterioration of social networks, and strong ties to
original homes are the main reasons why residents were reluctant to relocate.

3.4.5 Disruption of Livelihoods due to Relocation
Most reluctance to relocate revolves around the different ways this dramatic
change would disrupt livelihood strategies. Since most families rely on agriculture,
moving away from farmland proved difficult. New Verapaz is too far away from
traditional agricultural lands, cherished homes, and other economic opportunities. Access
to lands is not only important for convenience, but it is also important to be close to
ensure that produce and animals are not stolen.
Our [farm] land is close, but leaving here for [outer reaches of New Verapaz] our
lands would be too far away. We barely make enough to feed ourselves. Having to
travel and pay for gasoline would take away any remaining profits. – Interview 1
with resident of uninhabitable zone who chose not to relocate.
One of the advantages [of living here] is this is the zone we work. We work the
land. If we leave, we leave everything behind, and it’s taken years of effort. Thirty
years we’ve been here, we couldn’t leave. We stay here because this is where we
have everything, and if we leave, we have to leave it all behind. We would have to
start all over, alongside strangers, with a new lifestyle. – Interview 1 with
resident of uninhabitable zone who chose not to relocate.
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Since homes and some plots are passed from generation to generation, the
modifications and improvements are highly valued, especially since the investments
required to make these changes take so much work. To abandon years of hard work and
dedication to make a place “home” was considered unthinkable.
In addition, homes in New Verapaz are located off the main road and far away
from the bus route, so unlike Verapaz very little business traffic arrives to household-run
shops since there is no public transportation into or throughout the new settlement.
Relocation meant an inconvenient commute for all residents, including wage laborers and
women traveling to participate in market activities. Acquiring reliable transportation from
New Verapaz to the main transportation routes in Verapaz proved to be too much for
some residents. One relocated individual who decided to return to the uninhabitable zone
explained:
Sometimes we got a ride [out of New Verapaz], but sometimes we had to have
money to travel, unless we wanted to walk out on foot. Sometimes we found a ride
to drop us off [near Verapaz], but afterwards, I said, “Its better if we stay here [at
our old house]. – Interview 2 with resident who relocated but chose to return to
the uninhabitable zone
Increased distance is an inconvenience, but access to electricity and water are
vital for many tasks that further diversify income generation. There was no electricity,
and there were only communal bathroom facilities in New Verapaz, even two years after
the completion of the first round of permanent houses.
Some of us never left [our original home] even from the beginning because there
was no electricity [in New Verapaz]. – Interview 2 with resident who relocated
but chose to return to the uninhabitable zone.
I lived in the new settlement for a year. I lived there for a year because they said
they would provide electricity and that we would each have our own bathroom,
but that never happened. – Interview 4 with resident who relocated but chose to
return to the uninhabitable zone.
For families with diversified livelihoods running small shops that required power
(e.g. seamstresses, dairy vendors needing refrigeration, corner store owners), it was
impossible to run their business without electricity, which dissuaded small business
owners.
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There are people here [in their old houses] that have been given new houses there
[in New Verapaz] but they don’t go because the cheese spoils. There is no way to
refrigerate. – Interview 2 with resident who relocated but chose to return to the
uninhabitable zone.
Also, gifted plots of land in New Verapaz are small (10 x 20 meters), especially
when compared to the space to which residents were accustomed. Finally, homes are
built right next to one another (Figure 4). There is no room in New Verapaz to have
animals (e.g., chickens, cows, pigs, goats), which are highly valued in the local culture
and help provide families with food and additional income.

3.4.6 Disruption of Social and Kinship Networks and Ties to Home
In addition to livelihood disruption, the unweaving of the tightly-knit social fabric
was a major factor that dissuaded families from relocating. A lottery-type system was
employed to help fairly distribute new homes. Similar problems with this style of housing
distribution were documented in Turkey, as family units were randomly distributed
throughout resettlement areas and received homes at different stages of the project
(Enginoz 2004). This system, which was specifically engineered to avoid suspicions of
political favoritism, had the unintended consequence of destroying familial networks.
When families and neighbors were not allowed to move together as one unit into New
Verapaz, moving meant that the social capital that this network traditionally provides was
fractured. In the nearby Lempa River Basin, social capital was regarded by Bankoff et al.
(2009: 82) as a major factor in “reducing vulnerability and an unavoidable starting point
for risk reduction.” Residents who had relied on family and neighbors for generations
were suddenly forced to live apart in different regions of New Verapaz. New neighbors
were sometimes complete strangers, as many of the people on the beneficiary list were
homeless individuals who had flocked to the area in hopes of taking advantage of the
assistances being offered to the affected population. Families relocated based on the
“luck of the draw” lottery system rather than family and kinship units that defined
community life in Verapaz.
During times of need, families and proximal neighbors support one another. In
many instances, extended families and trusted neighbors occupied an entire block or
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portion of a neighborhood. Whether it be watching the house while a family member was
out of town or working the field, trading different food crops, babysitting or even sharing
child-rearing responsibilities, this social support network was key to a smoothfunctioning way-of-life. Relying on family and neighbors was considered necessary.
The truth is, with all of the other problems we have, we don’t have people here
looking for more problems [delinquents]—we don’t allow it…life goes on and we
live on. At least we survive. The truth is, if you need something but don’t have it
and I do, then we both get by. It’s a form of co-existing. – Interview 3 with
resident of high-risk area who never relocated to New Verapaz.
People get along really well here, even more so after [the disaster], we are even
more like family. We are more united. It’s OK if someone needs something—
between everyone we find a way to solve it…I tried to live [in New Verapaz] but it
was insufferable. – Interview 9 with resident who relocated but returned to the
uninhabitable zone.
Not only did the lottery prohibit extended family and neighbors to move together,
the actual size of the new house was not conducive for multi-generational families. The
new houses only had two small bedrooms, so the design of the home made it impossible
for entire family units to move together. This is one of the primary reasons why newly
provided homes in New Verapaz are occupied but existing homes within the
uninhabitable and high-risk areas are also occupied by the same extended family. For
many families, select members have relocated, leaving the other portion of the family
behind because there is simply not enough space.
The mayor came here and told us to go to the new settlement. I told him “Yes” but
only if they gave me the same size plot. He said, “No” and that he couldn’t give
me any more land. The lot is tiny. So I told him, “No thanks.” – Interview 1 with
resident of uninhabitable zone who chose not to relocate.
In addition to plots and houses being small, houses are very close together, which
has caused social problems.
We hear about problems with neighbors, that they don’t get along. Remember that
when you have houses like that, like in San Salvador, where one wall serves two
houses—no way, man! They even know how you sleep, and it’s terrible! –
Interview 3 with resident of high-risk area who never relocated to New Verapaz.
We are not accustomed to living this way, in these spaces [closely spaced houses].
-- Interview 23 with relocated resident whose original house in the high-risk zone
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was damaged but not destroyed.
This system not only divided familial networks, but it also brought to light a
completely different problem—individuals and families from outside Verapaz who
mysteriously appeared on the list of beneficiaries to receive houses. Local families
continuing to live in their old homes frequently describe “aprovechados”—people from
other towns that came to take advantage of the aid by saying they resided in the area but
lost everything and are therefore deserving of a new, free house. A majority of
interviewees explain that some of the first houses donated were, in fact, given to
complete strangers that no one in Verapaz recognized. This resulted in major frustration
and overall distrust in the process of project implementation, as well as cultivated
suspicions of political favoritism—the very thing the lottery system claimed to avoid.
Some groups of families attempted to circumvent the lottery system by waiting to
accept a new, permanent home. They are waiting until the very end of the lottery, even
though they come up “next in line” to receive a new house. This reluctance is based on
the hope that if they forego a home when their name is called, at the end of the project,
the remaining families will all get to move together in the same area of New Verapaz.
Finally, residents repeatedly refer to their land as their “home”— it is where the
family has lived for generations. As long as conditions do not improve in New Verapaz,
there is no incentive to leave the area that is so familiar and has always proved sufficient
to meet basic needs. Simply put, New Verapaz is not “home.”
I came back in May [2010], and I felt at peace because this is where I have lived
for so long…They gave me a provisional house, but I couldn’t stand living there.
Firstly, because there wasn’t power. The house was very small. The sun was so
strong, it was so hot in the afternoon—so hot. And the [communal] bathrooms
were filthy… – Interview 4 with resident of uninhabitable zone who relocated but
returned to original home.

3.4.7 Relocation success
As noted above, a number of unintended outcomes resulted from the relocation
scheme. In particular, some of these actually served as DRR strategies, although not in
the ways that any DRR experts had intended. For example, the design of the resettlement
effort and the distribution of homes at Nuevo Verapaz has unintendedly provided an
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emergency alternative housing option for many of the families that have chosen not to
relocate. Having friends, family, or tenants living in their donated house ensures that they
have a place to go during emergencies.
Every rainy season we leave. When it gets bad, I leave—I pack my bag and I
leave. I am scared, but I live here [uninhabitable zone]. When the rainfall is
strong, I go [to the new settlement]. – Interview 15 with resident of high-risk zone
who claimed a new house but continues to reside in the original home.
People come back here [uninhabitable zone] because they feel more comfortable
with everything they have in their homes. But in the rainy season, when the storms
come, they leave running. A lot of people still run over there [to the new
settlement]. – Interview 19 with resident of high-risk zone who claimed a new
house but continues to reside in the original home.
This partial relocation was clearly not the intended result of the new settlement,
but at least during times of crisis, families are aware that they are in danger and flee to a
safer area.
A successful relocation effort that fully removed people from at-risk zones might
be attainable in El Salvador if certain criteria were met, including:
1.) A new home with lands equal to or better than previous conditions
2.) A guarantee that families, neighbors, and friends live in close proximity to
each other, as was the case before the 2009 disaster
3.) Access to water, electricity, and sanitation facilities that are essential for
healthy living and the needs of small businesses
4.) Proximity to farm lands
5.) Adequate space and permission to tend chickens, pigs, cattle, goats, etc.
6.) Easy access to public transportation.
However, these criteria were not met, and as a result, the portions of Verapaz that
have been deemed uninhabitable are still occupied.

3.5 Conclusions
Throughout the world, relocation programs will likely continue since they can
reduce or eliminate a population’s spatial exposure to natural hazards. Success of these
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programs, as suggested by this study, depend The Salvadoran national government and
DRR institutions active in the region around Verapaz are making strides to reduce
disaster risk within vulnerable Salvadoran communities. Financial, organizational, and
human resource support invested in Verapaz and surrounding communities is making a
positive contribution in terms of hazard awareness, education, and preparedness. Interinstitutional coordination between Civil Protection, the University of El Salvador, and a
host of NGOs improved since 2009, and efforts are now undertaken collaboratively
building off the expertise of each agency. The evidence gathered ethnographically in this
study shows that institutions and residents are closing the communication gap that existed
prior to 2009. These programs and this critical information focus primarily on
community-based monitoring, open dialogue and improved communication between
residents and authorities, and improved planning to reduce disaster risk.
Nevertheless, a more holistic understanding of vulnerability and risk--including
both social and geophysical—was not incorporated by project implementers in Old and
New Verapaz, and outcomes were of mixed success. In this case, project design and
implementation reduced physical vulnerability for some but could not achieve broader
success because livelihoods and social networks were disrupted by relocation. Had the
project considered ways to reduce these impacts, residents would likely have been less
reluctant to leave their high-risk settlement. In lieu of this, residents adapted the best they
could, and some success was achieved by those who took advantage of the program
design to help diversify livelihoods while providing alternative housing during
emergencies. But many still live in the high-risk and uninhabitable zone with no
alternative housing. Others have relocated, but found themselves cut off from vital
livelihood resources and opportunities as well as crucial social networks. Providing basic
needs, adequate living conditions, and proximity to livelihood activities in addition to
allowing family and social networks to relocate together were the main factors that
residents felt could have aided successful project implementation. Since these criteria
were not met, many families that relocated have now returned to their original homes in
the higher risk zones, and others never left at all.
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Throughout the world, relocation programs will likely continue since they can
reduce or eliminate a population’s spatial exposure to natural hazards. Success of these
programs, as suggested by this study, depend in part on how overall vulnerability
(including economic, social, political, etc.) is reduced. Cultural and sociopolitical context
varies from country to country and from community to community, making a stepwise,
universal relocation “best practices” plan nearly impossible. However, there are some
basic tenets that should be considered in order to achieve broader community buy-in.
These are:
1) Access to livelihood activities
2) Continuance of social networks
3) Culturally appropriate housing that meets basic needs
4) Community participation throughout the design and implementation of the
Project
This case study shows how historical land tenure and marginalization of the poor
exposed people in Verapaz to the lahar hazard at San Vicente volcano, but that through
these struggles important kin and social networks emerged to provide support to one
another. While some DRR efforts, like CBEWS may find reasonable success even though
they mainly focus on geophysical hazards, this history and these local adaptive strategies
to social and geophysical vulnerability cannot be ignored in a relocation scheme. This
case also shows the importance of understanding the dynamics and uniqueness of each
population before implementing a relocation effort. That said, this approach takes time,
money, political will, and institutional capacity, all resources in short supply in the
immediate aftermath of a disaster.

List of abbreviations
CEPRODE – Centro de Protección Para Desastres (Center for Disaster Protection)
DRR – Disaster Risk Reduction
GO – Governmental Organization
NGO – Nongovernmental Organization
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GOES – Government of El Salvador
SNET – Servicio Nacional de Estudios Territoriales (National Service for Territorial
Studies)
MARN – Ministerio de Medioambiente y Recursos Naturales (Ministry of Environment
and Natural Resources)
UES-FMP – Universidad de El Salvador – Facultad Multidisciplinaria Paracentral
(University of El Salvador – Multidisciplinary Faculty of the Paracentral)
UNDP – United Nations Development Program
UNISDR – United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
USGS – United States Geological Survey
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Chapter 4: Field characterization of weathered volcanic slopes
for rainfall-induced landslide potential: San Vicente
Volcano, El Salvador
Abstract
Four years after Hurricane Ida triggered shallow, rainfall-induced landslides at San
Vicente volcano in central El Salvador, two seismic refraction campaigns were organized
to characterize weathered volcanic slopes proximal to the November 2009 failures and
surface cracks that appeared post Tropical Depression 12E in October 2011. Prior field
work and slope stability modelling conducted in 2012 at San Vicente volcano indicated
that rising or perched water tables during heavy rainfall events could be a contributing
factor to triggering shallow landslides. Field campaigns were conducted in May 2013
(end of the dry season) and sites were reoccupied in November 2013 (end of the rainy
season) in order to capture seasonal changes in soil saturation with active seismic
refraction methods. Three sites were selected for analysis. Results indicate repeatability
in testing methods as similar refractors and velocities were identified in both campaigns
at all three sites. P-wave velocities varied only slightly between both campaigns,
indicating that, at least for 2013, saturated refractors were either not identifiable, did not
vary in depth, or were too deep to capture with the methods used. Survey repeatability
demonstrates that the methods used performed well in weathered volcanic slopes;
however, future campaigns should be performed after particularly heavy rainfall events or
combined with other geophysical methods like resistivity to better capture soil saturation
changes.

Based on: Bowman, L., Richardson, J., and Gierke, J.S. Manuscript in preparation for submission. Field
characterization of weathered volcanic slopes for rainfall-induced landslide potential: San Vicente Volcano,
El Salvador
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4.1 Introduction
Steep, volcanic slopes in tropical regions are highly susceptible to shallow,
rainfall-induced landslides and debris flows/lahars (Frattini et al., 2004; Scott 2001; Scott
et al., 2005). San Vicente volcano in central El Salvador experienced 355 mm of intense
rainfall from Hurricane Ida rain over a five-hour period spanning 8-9 November 2009,
culminating an already above-average rainy season. The hurricane rains triggered shallow
landslides on the northern flank and quickly transformed into bulking debris flows
(lahars) that filled channels and inundated low-lying areas of Verapaz, Guadalupe,
Tepetitan, and San Vicente communities depicted in Figure 4.1. More than 200 people
were killed (EM-DAT 2009), 75,000 persons displaced, and the disaster ranks as the third
most costly in El Salvador’s history with US$315,000,000 in damage (Tellman 2011;
Bowman and Henquinet 2015; GOES 2009).

Figure 4.1 Landslides and debris flow inundation areas after Hurricane Ida, November
2009. (Modified from; SERVIR 2009). 13.595°N, 88.837°W, 2182 masl.
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Even though five recorded lahars/landslides have occurred at San Vicente volcano
over the last 350 years, very little research has been conducted to better understand
rainfall-induced triggering mechanisms or educate at-risk populations to the hazards
inherent to the area.
Smith et al. (2015) studied the stability of select slopes on San Vicente to
determine the most important properties influencing the potential for failure. Naturally
the steepness, mechanical strength, and water content were important variables for the
slope stability. They also found that depth to the water table was critical in leading to
conditions where the slopes were more likely to fail. A low-permeability bedrock layer
contributed to conditions promoting a shallow water table in the relatively permeable
unconsolidated materials. Field observations from 2012 and 2014 showed shallow
bedrock was evident in some of the landslide scarps from the 2009 lahars.
Rainfall amounts from Tropical Depression 12E led to the appearance of surface
cracks in some of the highest cultivated (coffee) slopes on San Vicente (Bowman et al.,
in review). These cracks and the intense rainfalls occurring in the vicinity of the previous
lahar triggering events caused significant concern for local officials and residents
(Bowman et al., in review). Confident assertions as to whether the cracks were superficial
and benign or expressions of impending failures similar to the 2009 catastrophe were
impossible to make due to the lack of understanding of the slope conditions. That is, were
the slopes thin layers of loose unconsolidated deposits or thick; did shallow perched
aquifers exist, etc.? While it was impractical to characterize all the slopes, we chose to
conduct a sequence of focused field campaigns aimed at answering the shallow
conditions (depths to bedrock and water tables) in select parts of the volcano. This paper
describes time-lapse seismic refraction surveys performed on the northern flank of San
Vicente volcano in 2013 with the goal of better characterizing slope lithology, watersaturation conditions, and the potential for perched aquifers by comparing time-lapse
differences observed between the wet and dry seasons.
Little is known about hillslope hydrology after heavy rainfall that leads to slope
instability. Rainfall duration and intensity are widely known factors contributing to slope
instability, but a useful, tested rainfall threshold for forecasting purposes has not been
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calculated for San Vicente Volcano. The national, departmental, and municipal
governments realized that in order to make more effective risk-reducing decisions before,
during, and after emergencies and issue timely warning and alerts, decision-makers need
to be better informed about landslide/debris flow triggers. For this to be possible,
establishing baseline data and initiating research efforts to better understand factors
affecting slope stability were posed as necessary “first steps” for practitioners working in
San Vicente.

4.2 Background
Seasonally perched aquifers forming above shallow, low-permeability finegrained soil and/or rock layers have been identified as contributing factors that trigger
landslides (Terlien 1998; Van Asch et al., 1999). No hydrological nor stratigraphy data
exist at San Vicente Volcano. Its eruptive inactivity in a country with potentially
dangerous active volcanoes has relegated San Vicente Volcano rather low in research
priority. Even after the 2009 disaster, few research efforts have been directed at creating
baseline data to better understand landslide triggers at San Vicente Volcano.
San Vicente Volcano has not erupted in the Holocene. Its thick soils are interbedded with ash layers from eruptions of nearby Ilopango Volcano, which has erupted
Tierra Blanca ash deposits at least once since the last eruption of San Vicente. The ash
layers have formed soils and been eroded and incised due to the tropical climate of El
Salvador (Jibson and Crone 2001; Smithsonian-GVP 2013). Relatively impermeable
basalt and basaltic andesite from old lava flows, and hydrothermally altered, fine-grained
clayey layers may slow vertical drainage of the surficial soils. Sufficient saturation of
these slopes may have potentially reduced the strength of the slopes and caused the onset
of the failures observed in 2009 (Rolo et al., 2004). San Vicente Volcano (Chichontepec)
has twin edifices, roughly trending East-West. The younger edifice is east of the older
edifice. Though landslides have occurred on both edifices, the older, more-weathered
western edifice has historically experienced more frequent shallow landslide/disaster
events.
A post-disaster inspection lead by the Volcano Disaster Assistance Program
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(VDAP) team from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and El Salvador’s
Servicio Nacional de Estudios Territoriales (SNET) identified five major slope failures
that caused supersaturated volcanic debris to flow into drainages and inundate
communities on the northern flank of San Vicente Volcano (Schweig 2010). The physical
characteristics of the relatively small landslides (1 – 3 m in thickness) permitted bulking
as they flowed downslope, resulting in flow volumes between 100,000 – 350,000 m3
(Schweig 2010).
Intense rainfall triggered the 2009 disaster (as well as the 1913 and 1934
disasters), so preliminary research to evaluate slope stability characteristics was
conducted in May 2012 by Michigan Technological University Masters student Daniel
Smith (Smith 2012; Smith et al. 2015) working with local governmental and nongovernmental agencies and to lay the foundation for future work. Smith et al. (2015) used
Rocscience slope-stability software and data collected during field work (Smith 2012)
(grain size analysis and permeameter data) to evaluate the most probable slope failure
triggers according to the precipitation and limited geological data available as inputs into
the model. His findings revealed that depth to the water table was likely the most
important factor affecting slope stability. Rising water tables throughout the wet season
could reduce stress on steep slopes and be a triggering mechanism leading to slope
failure. Their work suggested that the uppermost layer of soil is largely composed of ash
and pyroclasts from neighboring Ilopango Volcano, and at very shallow depths these
soils were extremely permeable and likely highly efficient at draining water down to
impermeable layers (Smith et al. 2015). These preliminary conclusions pointed to a
logical “next-step” in designing a method that would monitor water table/soil saturation
migration between the dry and rainy seasons.
Just months after Smith’s work, the Universidad de El Salvador – Facultad
Multidisciplinaria Paracentral (UES-FMP), located in the town of San Vicente 8 km from
the volcano, was awarded a small U.S. State Department-funded grant alongside
Michigan Technological University (MTU) through the Partnership for Enhanced
Engagement in Research (PEER) program to initiate baseline data gathering regarding
landslide and flooding hazards for the region (Bowman et al., chapter 2). Together, with a
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host of local institutions (Civil Protection, El Centro de Protección para Desastres
(CEPRODE); The National Civilian Police, and local governments), research was
directed to better inform decision-makers by studying landslide triggers and identifying
lahar inundation zones. The MTU/UES-FMP research group determined that highresolution, time-lapse seismic refraction surveys would be an appropriate tool to capture
changes in water table depth and soil saturation, if implemented at the end of the dry and
rainy seasons.

4.3 Methods
4.3.1 Site Identification and Survey Timing
The methods outlined in this work were chosen to capture details of the shallow
subsurface. This investigation does not pretend to predict specific areas that might fail in
the future, nor does it consider massive, sector collapse-type slope failures. A 2001
USGS report analyzing debris-flow hazards at San Vicente indicates that shallow
landslides provoking small volume (100,000 – 300,000 m3) lahars are most likely, which
is precisely what occurred in 2009 (Major 2004).
Seismic refraction surveys were conducted at three locations in May (17 – 19) and
November (6 – 8) 2013—months marking the transitional periods from dry-to-wet and
wet-to-dry seasons, respectively (Proteccion Civil 2011). During the dry season, we
conducted the surveys on the upper slopes. Two sites were adjacent to two separate areas
that failed in 2009, and a third site was proximal to surface cracks that appeared after
heavy rainfall from Tropical Depression 12E in October 2011. The first set of surveys
conducted 17 – 19 May 2013 coincide with the very end of the dry season when soils
would be at their driest state. The same three survey sites were revisited the first week of
November 2013 coinciding with the tail-end of the rainy season. The three survey
locations (Infiernillos, Finca El Carmen, and Finca 3 Rios) were chosen based on
accessibility and proximity to slopes known to have failed in the recent past.
Infiernillos is on the eastern slope of a ridge that divides the twin edifices and is
located just west of the Infiernillos hydrothermal vents. The site was chosen for its
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unique characteristics. During heavy rainfall associated with Tropical Depression 12E in
October 2011, linear cracks/sinkholes formed at the crest of the ridge upslope from the
survey site. Geothermal alteration of the surficial deposits may be more pronounced at
this site because of the prevalence of hot springs. Finally, slopes at higher elevation in
this drainage failed in 2009, which triggered the most destructive lahar that inundated
portions of Verapaz (Figure 4.2 (a,b)).

Figure 4.2 (a,b) Images showing devastation and lahar path through the town of
Verapaz, El Salvador on 10 November 2009 (Photo credit: Jose Fredy Cruz Centeno).
Finca El Carmen is on the northern slopes of the younger, west edifice. Though
this area did not experience as many or large slope failures as the east edifice in 2009, at
least seven surficial cracks were reported in October 2011 after 12 days of heavy rain
from Tropical Depression 12E. Community Civil Protection brigades reported these
cracks to the UES-FMP as well as municipal governments and follow-up inspections
measured and located each of these cracks using GPS. For this reason, Survey Site 2 was
chosen due to public and institutional concerns about the stability of slopes in this area.
Finca 3 Rios is on the west edifice and was chosen due to its proximity to a series
of landslides, many of which started after the January and February 2001 earthquakes,
and were reactivated during the rains from Hurricane Ida in 2009. The survey was
conducted on a ridge with major slides on both sides further up-slope.

4.3.2 Time-lapse Seismic Refraction
The seismic-refraction surveys were designed and conducted without a priori
knowledge of the shallow geology. The intentions were to delineate the soil, rock, and
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hydrological stratigraphy in the three sites that may be prone to future sliding. Time-lapse
seismic refraction was performed by reoccupying the three sites at the end of the rainy
season, and analyze the waveforms to show differences, if any, in arrival times between
the two surveys were compared to characterize seasonal changes in the shallow soil
moisture or water table depths. A waveform comparison approach allowed detection of
subtle changes in both the depth to potentially perched water tables and relative soil
moisture distributions within the soil profile. Without relying solely on travel-time
differences from subjective identification of waveform arrival, the actual waveforms can
be compared using this method, improving the detection limits of the method. To reduce
ambiguity in differentiating changes in saturation from changes in lithology, both shearand compressional-wave refraction surveys were performed.
The time-lapse waveforms should show subtle changes in both water table and
saturation profiles as water content affects sound velocities. The endpoints of each line
were marked with stakes and spray paint for reliable reoccupations. Survey points were
established using a measuring tape, and inclination measurements were made 10-m apart
using a Leupold 63335 Range finder with a built-in inclinometer. We linearly
interpolated the elevation of survey points between each inclination measurement.
Relative elevation was designated as zero elevation for one survey point in each line. A
compass was used to measure the line orientation, and each line was followed as parallel
as possible to the dip of the topography, assuming that most of the lithology variation
occurred downslope.
A sledge hammer and metal plate were used to create the sound source (“shot”)
for each survey. Each shot location was sampled with at least 20 hits and the results from
each were added, a process referred to as stacking. The sledgehammer was equipped with
an inertial switch with which to instantaneously trigger the timer in the seismograph.
Waveforms were recorded using a 24-channel Geode Ultra-Light Exploration
Seismograph connected to vertical geophones with a 4-Hz natural period. Sampling
lengths were adjusted for each site in order to record all coherent arrivals. All waveforms
were recorded at -0.2 s (before start time) with a 0.5 ms sampling interval. We chose to
record waveforms prior to the start time in order to allow us to filter ambient noise from
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the data without introducing edge-effect artifacts. Geophones were placed at 2 m
intervals from 14 to 60 m along each survey line, as we anticipated shallow refractors for
each of the survey sites. For the May (pre-rainy season) surveys, numerous redundant
shot points were performed so that the stratigraphy could be determined, as the dry
ground resulted in poor coupling between the steel plate and the ground. Some shot
points were reoccupied in the November (post-rainy season) survey so that time-lapse
comparisons could be made and additional shot locations were occupied to clarify
uncertainties in the stratigraphy identified in the May surveys. The first-arrival time picks
were made using only the unfiltered data from the May surveys.
Although we make use of very little of the data in this manuscript, we also
performed horizontally polarized shear (SH) wave refraction using transversely oriented
horizontal geophones in the surveys. We used a buried and inclined plate as the source
(transversely oriented), which was rotated 180 degrees after 20 hits, so that each shot
point possessed 40 hits, 20 in each direction. In this manner, through subtracting the
positive transverse from the negative transverse shot directions, any P or vertically
polarized shear (SV) waves would cancel, leaving only SH arrivals (Franklin 1979).
Using the SH time-lapse aided in isolating the subsurface structure from changes in fluid
saturation, and velocities from each survey were used to estimate the shear modulus for
fluid substitution. These data proved too noisy for use in our primary interpretation, but
were used to estimate the SH velocity of the surface layer at Site 3 for the fluid
substitution calculation (Table 4.1).

4.4 Results
The surveys revealed different soil and moisture stratigraphies at each site. Three
distinct layers (two refractors) were interpreted at one site, two layers (one refractor) at
another, and one layer (no refractors) at the last site. The layers are thought to comprise a
surficial dry layer of loose soil, an underlying layer of highly fractured bedrock
potentially mixed with soil, and a deeper wet and/or intact-rock layer.

4.4.1 Los Infiernillos
100

Los Infiernillos is located to the west of a lahar path and an active hydrothermal
area. The survey line transects both a crop field (downslope) and coffee plantation
(upslope) with an average slope of 26º. The survey point at 60 meters was the high point
and designated as the origin with a survey elevation (zero) datum (see Figure 3). The
survey was oriented at N30E from the origin. Shot point locations occupied in May were
conducted from the negative and positive ends of the survey line; however, many of these
shots showed redundant results, so only two were required to make a complete
interpretation, namely shot points at 12 and 62 m. The first-arrival time “picks” are
shown in Figure 3a for these shot locations. Shots with further offsets (up to 12 m off
both ends) did not show any evidence of additional deeper refractors. The upper-layer
velocities were determined to be 510 and 450 m/s from the positive and negative ends of
the line, respectively, with the mean upper-layer velocity being 482 m/s. The up-dip
apparent velocity of the refractor was determined to be 960 m/s and the down-dip
apparent velocity was 900 m/s. The apparent dip of the refractor with respect to
topography is only about 1º, and depths beneath the 12 m and 62 m points were
determined to be 3.4 m and 4.1 m, respectively (Figure 3b).

Figure 4.3 (a,b) P-wave first break arrival times (small dots) from source locations at 62
and 12 m (large dots) (a), and interpreted refractor (solid line) from sources (large dots) at
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12 and 62 m off-end shot points at Los Infiernillos (b). Small dots (b) are survey points
along the line and x-axis is distance along the line projected to horizontal.
The seismic refraction surveys at this site were repeated at the end of the wet
season, in November, with four additional shot locations (2, 27, 43, and 60 m) which
were included to increase the confidence in the dry-season (May) survey interpretation.
To avoid damage to the corn crop grown during the rainy season, the geophone
placement was shifted 2 m from the previous May survey, so only 23 of the 24
geophones could be used for time-lapse comparison (see Figure 4.4). Nearly identical
first-break picks from both ends of this survey were identified despite the 2 m
discrepancy, indicating an imperceptible change in layer properties ascertained from the
seismic refraction methods. Figure 4.4 shows the time-lapse comparison from the shot
point at 62 m. Neither the direct nor refracted arrivals show any significant time shifts.

Figure 4.4 P-wave arrivals recorded from the shot point at 62 m individually normalized
from each survey to demonstrate variations in first arrival waveforms from the end of the
rainy season (red) to the end of the dry season (black). The survey location of each
geophone is indicated on the y-axis.

4.4.2 Finca El Carmen
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The seismic data were acquired within Finca El Carmen coffee plantation along
an average slope of 23º. The survey point at 60 m was the high point of this survey and
designated as the origin with an elevation (zero) datum (see Figure 4.5 (a,b)). The survey
was oriented at N10E from the origin. Shot-point locations occupied in May were used
from the negative end of the survey line at 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 m, from the positive end at
62, 64, 66, and 70 m, and a single split shot was performed at 26 m. Due to the
redundancy of many of the shots, only five were chosen for interpretation: 4, 12, 26, 62,
and 70 m. First-break picks are shown in Figure 5a for these shot locations. No clear
refracted arrivals from any of these shot locations were observed, and hence, changes in
lithology cannot be interpreted from these seismic data. The constant slope shown for all
of these shot locations is approximately equal to 340 m/s, which would be equivalent to
the speed of sound through air (or very dry, loose soil) at ambient temperatures. Although
these direct arrivals would be traveling at the same speed as the air-wave, we take these
to be the velocity of the dry unconsolidated soils as observed at the surface.

Figure 4.5 (a,b) A single layer with no refractor is observed from both directions at all
five shot points (a) with a relative elevation profile (b) along the survey line.
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While the data does not allow delineation of the geology at this site, the measured
velocities can be used in theoretical estimates of the minimum depth to the top of a
potential refractors. Assuming that a minimum of three geophones recording refracted
arrivals from the most-offset shot point (shot = 4 m) are needed, the minimum depth to a
horizontal refractor can be calculated using the measured velocities and the time-intercept
method (Staub 1969). Figure 4.6 shows a theoretical estimate of the maximum resolvable
depth to a hypothetical refractor with several reasonable refractor velocities, with the top
of the refractor exceeding 17 and 19 m for refractor velocities of 1000 and 1500 m/s,
respectively. In the case of this site, the repeat survey would only reveal changes in soil
saturation or the potential encroachment of water within the resolvable depth of the
survey geometry.

Figure 4.6 Hypothetical refractor depths resolved with reasonable refractor velocities in
volcanic terrain. Refractors deeper than about 20 m cannot be imaged.
The Finca El Carmen survey was repeated in November at shot points 4, 12, 62,
and 70 m. Additional split shots at 29 and 45 m were used to increase confidence due to
the lack of clear refractors in the May survey. Additional shots at off-end locations of -6
and 80 m were performed to increase the survey penetration depths. Neither the split
shots nor the further off-end shots illuminated any refractor. Figures 7a and 7b show the
time-lapse refraction waveforms overlain for shot locations 12 and 62 m, respectively.
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Due to inconsistent low-frequency noise encountered during the May and November
surveys, we performed a fourth-order high-pass Butterworth filter above 200 Hz. Neither
shot location reveals significant differences in the first-break pick times, but the
November survey shows a linearly increasing time delay that is offset in comparison to
the May survey. We interpret this as a slight decrease in the shallow soil velocity, but
cannot confidently differentiate this change between subtle saturation differences or
possibly slight errors in geophone or shot relocations in the November survey. The 12 m
off-end shot reveals a ~1% velocity decrease from 350 m/s to 340 m/s and the 62 m shot
from 353 to 347 m/s from May to November, although minor differences in first-break
interpretations may eliminate this velocity reduction entirely, so this difference should
not be considered significant. The Finca El Carmen site reveals survey repeatability, but
no measurable variations in water table depth nor soil saturation were revealed with the
seismic data.
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Figure 4.7 (a,b) First breaks in both directions were individually normalized from each
survey to demonstrate variations in first arrival waveforms from the end of the rainy
season (red) to the end of the dry season (black). The survey location of each geophone is
indicated on the y-axis. The arrival times reveal little change between seasons but show
survey repeatability.
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4.4.3 Finca 3 Rios
The seismic data were acquired within a portion of the Finca 3 Rios with an
average slope of 27º. Contrary to the other two survey sites, the survey point at 60 meters
was established at the topographically higher end of the survey line, but was still defined
at a relative elevation of zero (see Figure 4.8). The survey was oriented at N80E from the
origin (zero-meters distant). Shot point locations occupied in May were conducted from
the negative end of the survey line at 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 m, from the positive end at
62, 64, 66, 68, and 70 m, and two split shots were performed at 28 and 48 m. Figure 4.8a
shows the first-break picks selected at shot locations of 0, 12, 28, 48, 62, and 70 m. This
survey revealed consistent direct arrivals at velocities of 410 and 420 m/s from the 12 and
62 meter shot points, respectively, a clear primary refractor from both ends of the survey
and the split shots. A possible second refractor was imaged with data gathered at shot
points taken far from the positive end of the survey line. A dip in the primary refractor is
also evident around a position of 42 m. Depths perpendicular to the slopes beneath shot
points 12 and 62 meters were calculated to be 7 and 3 meters, respectively, using the
conventional time-intercept method. Figure 4.8b shows the simple interpretation of this
site.
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Figure 4.8 (a,b) P-wave first break arrival times (small dots = forward and reverse; small
X’s = split shots) from source locations at 0, 12, 28, 48, 62, and 70 m (large dots; a and
b), and interpreted refractor (solid line) from sources at Los Infiernillos (b). Small dots
(b) are survey points along the line and x-axis is distance along the line projected to
horizontal. The solid line indicating the refractor shows the shallow layer thickening
downslope.
The Finca 3 Rios survey was repeated in November at shot points 0, 4, 12, 62, 66,
and 70 m. Only the closest, on-end shot points at 12 and 62 m were used for the timelapse interpretation, shown in Figure 4.9. First-break lines were drawn independently on
each stage of the survey to highlight lithology changes, which ignored small-scale
variability in the refractor and focused on the average slope shown by the first-breaks.
Both ends show distinctly different P wave velocities between the May and November
surveys for the direct waves through the upper layer, with the November survey
displaying a lower velocity than the corresponding May survey. The two primary
refractor slopes are essentially parallel indicating that although the picks are shifted as a
result of a velocity change in the upper layer, the velocity of the refractor has not changed
substantially. The shot point at 62 m also shows a slight difference in slope between
108

layers for the second refractor (third layer), but the signal to noise ratio deteriorated
significantly for these offsets, which suggests that interpreting this minimal change in
velocity may not be appropriate due to data quality.
The arrivals of the direct wave through the upper layer show a slope in firstbreaks of slower velocity in November than May as recorded from both ends of the line.
Namely, the 12 m shot shows a first layer decrease in velocity from 420 to 360 m/s (14%
reduction), and the 62 m shot shows a first layer decrease from 420 to 380 m/s (10%
reduction). This change in velocity is significant and cannot be attributed to survey
uncertainty since this trend is apparent from both ends of the line. The refractor (second
layer) shows less variation in velocity between phases, namely a 10% decrease and 2%
increase respectively from each end. Note that the velocity values from the May survey
used to determine the general stratigraphy were determined mathematically using leastsquares regression and differ slightly from those interpreted in the time-lapse comparison.
Although we restrict our interpretation of the dispersed wave-train following the firstbreak to a qualitative interpretation, the time delay shown by the first trough visually
confirms an apparent phase shift (see Figure 4.9).
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Figure 4.9 (a,b) The first breaks in both directions were individually normalized from
each survey to demonstrate variations in first arrival waveforms from the end of the rainy
season (red) to the end of the dry season (black). The survey location of each geophone is
indicated on the y-axis. First breaks in both directions reveal a lower velocity only in the
first layer in November when compared to May, while the second and third layers are
nearly equivalent velocities but show accumulated delay from the slower first layer.
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In order to fully utilize the data to interpret water saturation changes within the
surface layer at this site, Gassmann fluid substitution was performed using the refraction
interpretation (Bachrach and Nur 1998; Han and Batzle 2004). Gassmann substitution
requires knowledge of the shear modulus, so the results from the SH survey also
performed at this site are used for this calculation. These data required low-pass filtering
below 50 Hz to eliminate P-wave arrivals and noise, but allowed a surface layer SH
velocity to be determined from the shots at 12 and 62 meters. Opposing transverse shot
directions clearly showed opposite polarities, and SH velocities determined were 165 and
170 m/s from 12 and 62 meter shot locations, respectively. First, a bulk density of the
andisol of 1280 kg/m3 is assumed (Lal 2006), which corresponds to water saturation of
80%, porosity of 60%, and grain density of 2000 kg/m3. The average SH velocity of 168
m/s and bulk density were used to solve for the shear modulus, determined to be 36 MPa.
Likewise, using the shear modulus, the bulk modulus of the saturated medium (in
November) was determined to be 128 MPa. Additional input parameters for these
calculations are listed in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Assumed rock properties, measured seismic velocities, and calculated
parameters used in fluid substitution.

Using equation 2 from Knight et al. [1998], the bulk modulus of the initial fluidair mixture was determined: air and water bulk moduli being 128 kPa and 2.15 GPa,
respectively. The bulk modulus of the initial fluid was 641 kPa, and substituting different
mixtures back into equation 2 [Knight et al. 1998], bulk moduli for different saturations
were calculated. Using Gassmann substitution (Han and Batzle 2004), P and SH
velocities for water saturations were determined to range from 0 to 1.0, namely from air
saturated pores to fully water saturated pores (Figure 4.10).
Saturation is almost certainly higher following the rainy season in November than
it was at the end of the six-month dry season in May, so P wave velocities are plotted
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from May to determine the lower saturation velocity intersection with the predicted P
wave velocity. The intersection yields an estimate of the May water saturation at 32%,
which is half of the water content determined from the November survey. Varying the
starting assumed saturation from 0.4 to 0.97 yields saturation increases from May to
November of 39% to 58%, indicating that the saturation increase is relatively insensitive
to the starting value of saturation (using the November survey as our starting saturation).
Only when the starting value of saturation is near 98% do minor changes in the saturation
value then heavily affect the P wave velocity (i.e. sharp increase; Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.10 Predicted and measured P and SH wave velocities and layer saturation
percentages for both May and November surveys.

4.5 Discussion
Characterizing slope lithology and the identification of perched water tables were
primary goals of this study following Smith’s et al. (2015) study indicating that
groundwater table depth was a critical factor leading to slope instability. Saturation
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differences due to accumulated rainfall between the dry and wet seasons might help us
understand whether water table depths varied seasonally and thus might contribute to
shallow landslides toward the end of the rainy season and during intense tropical rainfall
events.
Detecting perched water tables was not possible—not necessarily due to the
methods used, but because of other potential factors. This field work was conducted after
two consecutive comparatively light rainfall years. As seen in Table 4.2, 2012 and 2013
were both relatively dry years. One explanation is that saturated layers could not be
imaged because not enough precipitation had accumulated throughout the rainy season to
fully saturate soils above impermeable layers. Precipitation data were obtained from two
sources, both showing less-than-average rainfall amounts for 2012 and 2013. Data from
the aWhere Inc. online platform are compiled from a global network of weather stations
in conjunction with satellite data to provide weather information over 9 by 9 km grid
cells. “For rainfall, aWhere delivers a new blended rainfall product from Colorado State
University based on a constellation of 8 polar-orbiting satellites” (aWhere-Inc. 2014). In
situ precipitation data were obtained from both SNET and UES-FMP weather stations.
This data set shows significant time gaps due to the remote location and inaccessibility of
SNET’s weather station; however, the 2012 and 2013 data from the UES-FMP station is
complete. There are gaps in the data from May – July 2007, but even so, accumulations
reach 1671 mm of rainfall. Though the aWhere organization does not specify how rainfall
is calculated with satellite instrumentation, when compared with in-situ weather stations
at San Vicente volcano, the program likely underestimates the true value of accumulated
rainfall, as can be seen from comparing total amounts in Tables 4.2.
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Table 4.2 Precipitation data from aWhere Inc. platform (aWhere Inc. 2014) and SNET,
UES-FMP weather stations.
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Precipitation: Accumulated Rainfall (May – November)
Rainfall (mm) SNET and UES-FMP
Rainfall (mm) aWhere Inc.
1955
NA
No Data
NA
2044
NA
1671*
NA
2276
1195
2303
1021
Missing Data
1526
Missing Data
1175
Missing Data
800
1401 (March – November)
922

Due to the unreliable operation and data acquisition of the SNET weather station,
a new network of Davis weather stations was deployed by the Center for Disaster
Protection (CEPRODE) in 2012. Six stations now provide a more complete archive of
weather data for the entire northern flank of San Vicente volcano.
Not only was 2013 a relatively dry year, the tail end of the rainy season was
noticeably drier than average years. Only 220 mm of rain fell during the month of
October, which is less than half of the monthly average, and during the two weeks before
the November 2013 fieldwork, only 30 mm of rain was observed. Only 0.6 mm of rain
was measured the week before the field work. Even though the rainfall in 2013 was well
below average, it was sufficient to result in an increase in the water table height of a few
meters. Rising water tables were not observed, however, so either the water table is
deeper than anticipated or the permeability of these shallow volcanic deposits allow the
infiltration to flow downslope without significant buildup.
Although the rainy season was very moderate in 2013 (and 2012), data show that
the soils have a high capacity to absorb and retain moisture. Andisols are formed
primarily from volcanic ash and characteristically are able to retain moisture over long
periods of time (Shoji and Dahlgren 1994). During intense rainfall events, andisols can
become saturated. After a high rainfall year in 2009, finally ending with the Hurricane
Ida event (355 mm of rain over a five-hour period), soils were unable to drain or absorb
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additional precipitation, causing the shallow landslides (Smith et al., 2015). Results
confirm conclusions made by Smith et al. (2015) that slopes on San Vicente are highly
permeable, as no significant saturation changes were seen between the end of the dry and
wet seasons. Smith et al. (2015) also concluded that slope geometry proved a critical
factor in modeled landslide generation. Though field sites were chosen due to their
proximal location to past landslides, there is no indication that slope geometry at survey
sites was (or was not) conducive to slope stability.
Another reason why saturated layers were not imaged could be that subsurface
conditions at each of the three sites were not conducive to establishing perched water
tables. If an impermeable layer was absent at the selected site, then capturing saturated
layers would be difficult or impossible. Sites were selected due to their proximity of
slopes that had recently failed or were suspected weak slopes; however, subsurface
conditions could vary widely over short distances. Perhaps the slopes that failed in 2009
exhibit hypothesized conditions, and nearby slopes that were occupied for this
experiment drain more efficiently, and hence, did not fail in 2009.
The repeatability of the survey results bolster confidence in the methods chosen
for this work, but a consideration of other factors might render more robust results in the
future. Returning to the three survey sites after a normal (or extraordinary) rainy season
or after a significant tropical rainfall event might show saturated layers that were not
possible to image in 2013. Occupying completely new sites might broaden our
understanding of slope and subsurface characteristics and potentially identify new areas
where impermeable or saturated layers can be identified. Finally, combining the timelapse seismic refraction methods with other geophysical methods like resistivity surveys
might help constrain the interpretation of subsurface saturation characteristics.

4.6 Conclusions
Though this investigation did not identify a definitive water table depth nor
saturated layers at the three sites on San Vicente volcano, the time-lapse seismic
refraction methods used showed high repeatability and were able to image distinct
stratigraphic layers at sites where layers existed. Given normal wet-season conditions, a
116

broader selection of survey sites, and/or a campaign combined with other geophysical
methods, future campaign results might indicate the existence of perched aquifers or
other specific conditions that contribute to unstable slopes in volcanic terrains.
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